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I. INTRODUCTION
One necessary component to the success of the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process is economic development and growth in the area under the control of
the Palestinian Authority.1 One of the principal requirements for economic
growth, and quite possibly for the Palestinian Authority's economic survival, is2
foreign investment in WBG. As they currently exist, laws concerning foreign
investment in WBG are a quagmire. Indeed, it is a challenge for an investor to
simply identify which law applies to which area, let alone to interpret the law.
At the same time many of the protections often found in a transparent 'rule of
law' society are still lacking in the WBG.
1 See The West Bank and Gaza Strip Private Economy: Conditions and Prospects,
United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories (visited Mar. 7,
2000) <http:/www.arts.mcgill.calmepp/unsco/private/private.html> (noting that Palestine is
attempting to improve conditions for sustainable economic development). The areas under
the control of the Palestinian Authority consist of portions of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept. 28,
1995, Isr.-PLO, 36 I.L.M. 551 [hereinafter Interim Agreement]. The West Bank is divided
into areas "A", "B" and "C." See id. art. XI. The area of Palestinian self-rule consists of
areas "A" and "B". See id. Area "A" is currently comprised of eight Arab cities in the West
Bank. Id. Area "B" is comprised of smaller towns and villages in which Palestinian
jurisdiction extends to civil affairs, but where Israel retains control over internal security. Id.
Area "C" consists of the Israeli-controlled remainder of the West Bank. Id. The Palestinian
Council currently has jurisdiction over civil affairs in areas "A" and "B". See Interim
Agreement, art. XI, supra; see also Keith C. Molkner, Essay: Legal and Structural Hurdles
to Achieving Political Stability and Economic Development in the Palestinian Territories, 19
FORDHAM INT'LL.J. 1419, 1428-29 (1996) (discussing the division of areas under Palestinian
self-rule). The geographic scope of the jurisdictions was to change continuously throughout
the interim period. See Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, art.
II, 33 I.L.M. 622. The parties have failed to meet the timetable for the transfer of authority.
For a discussion of the timetable, see Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, art. IV, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993) (entered into force on Oct. 13,
1993) [hereinafter Declaration of Principles]. Thus, the final resolution of the reach of
Palestinian jurisdiction has not yet been resolved. However, efforts are ongoing to reach a
final status on the accords by fall 2000. See Danna Harmon, PM, ArafatAgrees to Relaunch
Talks: Summit Planned Today in Sharm el Sheikh to Announce Further Meetings in
Washington, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 9, 2000, at 1; Aluf Benn, The Barak-Arafat Ramallah
Agreement, HA'ARETZ, Mar. 7, 2000.
2 By WBG we mean the West Bank and Gaza. We use the term as coterminous with the
area under the control of the Palestinian Authority or Palestine.
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This article provides an examination of one such issue-the commercial
arbitration laws applicable to foreign investment in WBG.3 It first briefly
examines the operative arbitration laws applicable in the WBG. The paper
addresses the Law on the Encouragement of Investment adopted by the
Palestinian National Authority in 19954 and revised in 1998. 5 It then reviews
existing standards in international conventions and in neighboring countries.
Next, it addresses relevant PA legislation, the legal personality of the PA, and
what the PA can do to respond to the international community's need for
certainty in dispute resolution procedures. Next, it examines how a PA
arbitration law fits into the Interim Agreement. It then reviews the PA's current
draft arbitration law, and finally, it suggests a draft Palestinian international
commercial arbitration law. It considers, as well, the relationship between the
PA and Israel in terms of the PA's ability to make legal agreements prior to any
final resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
II. THE OSLO AGREEMENT
On September 13, 1993, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) signed the historic Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements. 6 The agreement stated that "[t]he aim of the Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is... to establish a
Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority... for the Palestinian peo,gle in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ... leading to a permanent settlement." As a
result of Oslo, the PLO established the Palestine Authority. Under an
agreement signed the following year the PA gained the ability to legislate
specific categories of laws for the areas under its control. 8 Recognizing the
3 The authors acknowledge that issues surrounding the peace process are complex; many
factors are involved and far more developments are needed than merely creating new law
regarding investment. This paper focuses on the narrow issue of international commercial
arbitration, while recognizing there are many areas of importance not discussed in this paper.
4 Law On the Encouragement of Investment (1995) (Palestinian Nat'l Authority),
translated in David P. Fidler, Foreign Investment in Palestine: An Analysis of the Law on
the Encouragement of Investment in Palestine, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 529, app. at 603-10
(1995) [hereinafter Investment Law].
5 Law on the Encouragement of Investment in Palestine, No. 28 (1998) (Palestinian
Authority) [hereinafter Revised Investment Law], reprinted in David P. Fidler, Foreign
Investment in Palestine Revisited: An Analysis of the Revised Palestinian Investment Law,
31CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 293, app. at 521, 523 (1999) (translation is (Revised) Official
English Translation translated by the Palestinian National Authority Ministry of Economy
and Trade).
6 Declaration of Principles, supra note 1, at 1534.
7 Id. at 1527.
8 Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho
Area, Article VII Legislative Powers of the Palestinian Authority, 33 I.L.M. 622 (1994).
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importance of foreign investment to economic survival in WBG, the PA began
work on revising the commercial laws of Palestine-specifically the investment
laws.9 The Palestinian Investment Law was enacted in 199510 and the Revised
Investment Law passed in April 1998."
Many countries and international organizations, recognizing the
importance of economic development in WBG to the peace process, have
offered their support. 12 The PA sought $13 billion in external financing in
Article VII states that the "Palestinian Authority will have the power, within its jurisdiction,
to promulgate legislation, including basic laws, regulations and other legislative acts." Id.
9 See Gary A. Hengstler & Richard L. Fricker, YasserArafat: My Vision, A.B.A.J., Feb.
1994, at 46, 49 ("Either we will be a Somalia because of the starvation of our people or we
will have another economic tiger in this area," Yasser Arafat responding to the question of
the importance of economic investment of other countries in Palestine).
10 Investment Law, reprinted in Fidler, supra note 4.
1 The Revised Investment Law, supra note 5.
12 See Palestinian National Authority Official Website, Special Reports: MOPIC's 1998
First Quarterly Monitoring Report of Donor Assistance (visited Jan. 23, 2000)
<http:llwww.pna.netlreports/aidreports/150698.htm>. Since the implementation of Oslo,
donors have pledged $349 million in aid. See id. For an overview of donor issues, see
generally Rick Hooper, The International Politics of DonorAssistance to the Palestinians in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 1993-1997, in SARA RoY (ed.), 3 THE ECONOMICS OF
MIDDLE EAST PEACE: A REASSESSMENT (Sara Roy & Karen Pfeifer eds., 1999). For a
discussion of issues donors desire addressed, see Ben Lynfield, Progress Report to
Strengthen PA Relations with Donor Countries, JERUSALEM POST, June 29, 1999, at 4.
"The United States pledged... $100 million each year for five years ($75 million in grants
and $25 million in OPIC loans and loan guarantees) beginning in 1994." Palestinians: U.S.
Assistance, CONG. RES. REP., Dec. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 13635536. The Middle
East Peace Facilitation Act "MEPFA," granted the President authority to suspend provisions
of law prohibiting U.S. and United Nations assistance to the PLO. MEPFA allows U.S.
contacts with and aid to the PLO and PA, so long as the PLO is abiding by commitments
under the Declaration of Principles, see Declaration of Principles, supra note 1.
As of the third-quarter of 1997, the U.N. Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied
Territories stated that $3.62 billion had been pledged by donor countries to the PNA, $3.03
billion had been committed and $1.83 billion had been disbursed to support Palestinian
development. See United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied
Territories, Special Report: The West Bank and Gaza Strip Private Economy (Feb. 1998)
("Special Report") <http:/www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/unsco/private.html> (visited Dec. 20,
1999). The majority of donor money to the WBG has been directed toward legal reform,
institution and capacity building, public infrastructure, education, health and public safety.
See id.
In response to the signing of the WYE agreement by Israel and the PLO, a donor's
conference was held in Washington D.C. on November 30, 1998 where 50 foreign donors
pledged to pay over $3 billion in aid to the PNA over the next five years. See Donor States
Pledge Over 3bn in Aid, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Dec. 8, 1998. See also
MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST, Dec. 11, 1998, p. 10 .
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connection with its Program for the Development of the Palestinian Economy,
in the period between 1994-2000.1" While millions of dollars have been
pledged for foreign investment programs in Palestine, most of the money has
not materialized.
The lack of both public and private investment has been attributed to a
number of factors including Israeli economic policy, 15 pervasive corruption,16
and "general political instability in the [WBG]."' 7 Legal factors, "including the
lack of a stable legal framework" also contribute to this lack of economic
development.18
13 See Hooper, supra note 12, at 63.
14 Cf Marjorie Miller, Nasty Piece of Mideast Business: Pact with Israel in '93 Prompted
a Return of Palestinian Entrepreneurs Who Now Struggle to Keep their Companies Afloat
AmidArmed Clashes and Military Closures, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1997, at Al, A23 (stating
that Palestinian officials and economists agree that overseas investment in Palestine has been
"disappointingly low"); see also Taghreed E1-Khudary, Israeli Checkpoints Scare Off
Palestinian Investors, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, July 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL
2159002 (noting that the Palestinian territories have seen a "dramatic economic downturn"
since the beginning of self rule in 1993).
15 See generally Ephraim Kleiman, Some Basic Problems of the Economic Relationships
between Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, in THE ECONOMICS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE
(Stanley Fischler et al., eds., 1993) (attempting to explain the political and economic
relationships between Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza); see also Samir Abdullah & Clare
Woodcraft, Israeli Closure Policy: Sabotaging Sustainable Development, 3 THE ECONOMICS
OFMIDDLE EAST PEACE: A REASSESSMENT, 1-28 (explaining how the closure policy of Israel
leaves the Palestinian economy vulnerable to both internal and external economic forces).
16 See Murray Kahl, Vanishing U.S. Funds and U.S. Administration Complicity, ISRAELI
& GLOBAL NEWS, app. B: Recent Initiative by Congressman Saxton, Oct. 30, 1997
<http://www.cmep.com/features.htm>; see also Murray Kahl, Corruption Within the
Palestinian Authority, ISRAELI & GLOBAL NEwS, Oct. 30, 1997
<http://www.cmep.com/features.htm>; Ilan Halevi, Self-Government, Democracy, and
Management Under the Palestinian Authority, 27 J. PALESTINIAN STUD., Spring 1998, at 35,
40-41 (articulating that corruption is a "feature of the institutional landscape that thirty years
of military occupation, with all its arbitrary rule and power abuse, could only aggravate in
popular perceptions," and the elements of the corrupted economy, such as "under-the-table
payoffs and outright bribery," which were carried over by the "institutional landscape");
Fidler, supra note 5, at 303-05.
17 Steve Rodan, Crisis of Confidence, JERUSALEM POST, July 11, 1997, available in 1997
WL 7956597.
18 Id. See Special Report, supra note 12; Edward Bennett Miller, Implementing the Oslo
Accords, 6 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 363, 373-74 (1998) (explaining the reasons the
Palestinian legal system discourages investment). See generally The Task Force Report by
the Conference on Foreign Relations, Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions 33-60
(Council on Foreign Relations, D.C., 1999) [hereinafter Council]. For a general discussion
of Palestinian private sector investment, see Fidler, supra note 4, at 307-09 (discussing low
levels of both domestic and foreign investment in the WBG).
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Perhaps the most fundamental prerequisite, and one of the most difficult
challenges, in advancing the WBG economy's prospect is development of its
legal system.19 Law reform efforts have been slow, in part, due to a lack of
financial resources.20 As one scholar has stated,"[t]he PA has yet failed to
establish a regulatory and institutional environment that would attract needed
levels of foreign investment that are so critical to the growth of the private
sector.
' 21
Another contributing factor is an inadequate court system in WBG.22 The
courts suffer from a host of maladies, including: "inadequate staffing at all
levels, ... inadequate salaries, repeated challenges to their independence from
the Israeli military government, crumbling physical facilities, and
administrative inefficiencies."
23
Yet another factor is the concomitant difficulty in enforcing judgments
(foreign or otherwise) in Palestinian areas, a complaint voiced by both Israelis24
19 See Special Report, supra note 12; see also Hiram E. Chodosh, Reflections on Reform:
Considering Legal Foundations for Peace and Prosperity in the Middle East, 31 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'LL. 427, 446-447.
20 See Chodosh, supra note 19, at 447.
21 Sara Roy, The Palestinian Economy and the Oslo Process: Decline and Fragmentation
3 (Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1998) (Emirates Occasional Papers
No. 24).
22 See Rodan, supra note 17. See generally George E. Bisharat, Palestinian Lawyers and
Israeli Role: Law and Disorder in the West Bank, 125-44 (1989) (discussing court systems
in the West Bank); Miller, supra note 18 at 389-393.
23 George E. Bisharat, Peace and the Political Imperative of Legal Reform in Palestine,
31 CASE W. RES. I. INT'L L. 253, 266 (1999). The donor community has invested
significant resources in promoting the rule of law in Palestine. Id. at 286. See also Chodosh,
supra note 19 at 430-32. An example of such efforts is the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights' grant of $3.2 million for the technical cooperation project
with the Palestinian Authority, which included both law reform efforts in the legislature and
judicial sector and human rights training for Palestinian police. See United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Technical Cooperation Project with the Palestinian
Authority: "Support for the Rule of Law" (PAL/95/AHI24) (visited Jan. 29, 2000)
<http:llwww.unhchr.chlhtmil/menu2/4/projectlpalestin.htm>. For analysis of one particular
rule of law problem, executive interference in the Judiciary, see INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY
UNIT, LAW-PALESTINIAN SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, EXECUTIVE INTERFERENCE IN THE JUDICIARY (1999).
24 "The Chamber of Commerce has asked the IDF to help them collect monies they say
Palestinian merchants owe Israeli suppliers. IDF Gen. Mendior (phonetic), coordinator of
activities in the territories, has been asked to look into canceling the entry permits of those
Palestinian salesmen who have run up debts in the millions of shekels. Israeli business
officials say they would prefer the debts be deducted from the monies the Finance Ministry
transfers to the Palestinian Authority." CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ASKS ARMY To HELP
COLLECT DEBTS FROM PALESTINIANS (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 6, 1997).
Another commentator has observed: "Before the establishment of the PA Israeli judgments
2000]
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and Palestinians. 25 Since the transfer of powers to the PA, there seems to be no
legal way to enforce the payment of debts owed by Palestinians. 26 "Judgments
given by Israeli courts cannot be enforced in the Territories, and dishonoured
cheques cannot be executed., 27 For their part, Palestinians also have real
problems in havin8 judgments executed against other Palestinians, at least
during the Intifada.
A final factor is the lack of a WBG tax and trade policy which
complements and encourages economic development.29 There is a need in
and dishonoured cheques could be enforced directly through the Israeli execution office. The
Israeli law preventing a person from opening bank accounts and drawing cheques after ten of
his cheques have been dishonoured, was adopted by the military authorities in Israel. As
further example, Israel drivers who became involved in accidents with Palestinian vehicles
bang their heads against a wall in attempts to collect insurance claims." Nadav Shragai,
Unsafe Passage, HAARETZ (Oct. 10, 1999).
25 "During the Intifada .... the Palestinian police officers charged with investigating
crimes prosecuted in the local courts and executing their judgments, resigned in masse,
causing the legal systems of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to all but cease to function."
Bisharat, supra note 23, at 266.
26 "If a contract is breached a businessman may theoretically turn to courts and court-
sanctioned arbitration methods for relief. In reality, however, use of the courts is limited and
Palestinians instead turn to conciliation, mediation, informal arbitration, and self-help to
resolve their contract disputes. Unfortunately, these mechanisms are unreliable." Ayesha
Qayyum & Tobias Nybo Rasmussen, Contract Enforcement Mechanisms in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, in COMMERCIAL CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
17, Commercial Law Report Series (IPCRI Law & Development Series 1997).
27 Talia Einhorn, The Need for a Rule-Oriented Israeli-Palestinian Customs Union: The
Role of International Trade Law and Domestic Law, 1997 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 315, 335
(1997).
28 As one commentary has pointed out:
Before 1987, judgments passed by the Palestinian courts were executed through the police.
The police in the West Bank and Gaza, though considered part of the Israeli Police,
contained in its lowest ranks some Palestinians. These Palestinians were responsible for
investigating offences where there was no Israeli interest, such as regulating traffic, and
inter-Palestinian crime. They were also charged with executing the judgments of the civil
courts.
At the beginning of the December 1987 Palestinian Intifada, the Intifada leadership called
upon the Palestinians working in the Israeli police force to resign. Almost all of them did.
The police stations and functions were taken over by the Military. The execution of the
judgments passed by the civil court thus suffered as Palestinians did not ask the Israeli
military to execute a civil judgment against other Palestinians.
International Commission of Jurists, The Civilian Judicial System in the West Bank: Present
and Future 47-48 (International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, June 1994).
29 See Amir Khoury, International Trade and Commerce: A Bridge for the Israeli-
Palestinian Peace, 7 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 11, 46-47 (1999) (arguing that
Palestinian economic progress and development of trade is necessary for stability in the
[Vol. 32:185
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Palestine for a "secure, predictable, and transparent legal framework" for
foreign investors "to conduct business activities." 30 Local businessmen claim
there is no coherent legal system in WBG, the "courts are not where disputes
are settled, and the laws are either contradictory or obsolete."31 Foreign
businessmen decry that "the lack of standard agreements deals a fatal blow to
legal certainty," on which international transactions must be based.32 It is
necessary to note that while the development of investment laws that meet
international standards is important, a well-developed body of civil and
commercial laws must also support them.
33
Lastly, the role that peace plays within the process cannot be ignored, for
"without more peace between Israel and the Palestinians, Palestinian trade will
remain uncertain because of its vulnerability to Israeli security actions; but
without more trade, the Palestinian people will continue to lose confidence in
the peace process as unemployment, poverty, and despair create fertile ground
for forces opposed to rapprochement with Israel.",34 It is in this regard that the
debate over the basic question of Palestine's identity becomes relevant.
35
region); see also FOREIGN INvESTMENTADVISORY SERVICE, WESTBANKAND GAZA: NOTES ON
THE LAW ON THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT 1 (1996) [hereinafter FIAS].
30 FIAS, supra note 29, at 1.
31 Amir H. Koury, An American Bank in the Palestinian Authority: Investing in the
Peace, 24 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 739, 749-52 (1999).
32 Id. at 752. "The conventional wisdom seems to be that foreign direct investment,
necessary for kick-starting a country's economy, will not migrate to the South unless the
luggage includes an arbitration clause." Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World:
A PleaforReassessing Bias under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 Harv. Int'l L.J. 419,422
(2000).
33 See Nathaniel Harrison, US Halts Funding for Office to Promote Investment in West
Bank, Gaza, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, July 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2154230
(attributing the U.S. Agency for International Development's decision to stop funding to
promote private U.S. investment in Palestine, in part, to "the failure of the Palestinian
Authority to enact legislation governing commercial transactions and investment").
34 Fidler, Peace Through Trade?, Developments in Palestinian Trade Law During the
Peace Process, 38 VA. J. INT'LL. 155, 186-87 (1998).
35 See infra, Part X. See generally Omar M. Danjani, Stalled Between Seasons: The
International Legal Status of Palestine During the Interim Period, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
PoL'Y 27 (1997); John Quigley, The Israel-PLO Interim Agreements: Are They Treaties, 30
CORNELLINT'LL.J. 717 (1997); John Quigley, Palestine's Declaration ofIndependence: Self
Determination and the Right of the Palestinians to Statehood, 7 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (1989);
M.C. Bassiouni, "Self Determination" and the Palestinians, AM. J. INT'LL., Sept. 1971, at3
(discussing the rights of Palestinians as "people" rather than as refugees).
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Il. OPERATIVE ARBITRATION LAWS APPLICABLE IN THE AREAS
UNDER CONTROL OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
The legal systems in WBG are complex and less than transparent to the
outside investor. The laws pertaining to foreign investment and arbitration
within WBG represent a "trilateral" legal system, drawing upon Jordanian,
Israeli and Mandatory legal history.3 6 Indeed, one can describe the composite
legal system of the WBG the way Norman Bentwich described the legal system
under the Mandate as "not Mosaic but a mosaic.
37
Law in mandatory Palestine derived from a variety of sources, both
Ottoman and British. Land law, as an example, was largely Ottoman, while
court procedure was largely British.38 The Mandatory gave rise to four dispute
resolution streams- the formal Mandatory court system, a set of informal
'arbitration courts' created by Jewish settlers to resolve disputes within the
Jewish community, traditional rabbinical courts, and the so-called comrades
courts run by the labor federation.39 The informal courts "known by the Hebrew
title of Mishpat Shalom or Peace Court... had their origin before the British
Occupation, when the Jewish population avoided as far as possible ... recourse
36 After being under military occupation, the British Mandate for Palestine came into
force in 1923. Norman Bentwich, The Legal System of Palestine Under the Mandate, Vol. II
MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 33, 39 (1948); see also http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalonl
palmanda.htm. The broad principle regarding the law under the Mandate was that the
Ottoman legislation, as it existed in 1914, was maintained, subject to modification by any
Ordinance or legislation by the British government. See id. If there were no provisions in
Ottoman or Palestinian law concerning a specific matter, the Palestinian courts were to apply
rules of English Common Law and English Equity. See id. The West Bank was occupied by
Jordan in 1948 and annexed in 1950; the Gaza Strip was occupied by Egypt but was not
annexed. See MAZEN E. QuPTY & ASSOCIATES, LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN
PALESTINE 2 (1995). Israel occupied both territories in 1967, but preserved the
'administrative separation' by assigning separate military commanders for the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip. See Molkner, supra note 1, at 1430.
37 Bentwich, supra note 36, at 33.
38 See Norman Bentwich, Law and the Courts of Palestine, 2 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 37, 41-45
(1924). For Mandatory court structure see S.G. Kermack, Courts and Legal Policy in
Palestine, THE SCOTS. L. TIMES, 81 (April 23, 1982). See also Leon H. Rose, Judicial
System of Palestine, 29 COM. L.J. 245 (1934) (providing further explanation of the
implementation of Palestinian law); Norman Bentwich, supra, 37-50; Philip Marshall
Brown, British Justice in Palestine, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 828 (1918). See generally RAJA
SHEHADEH, FROM OCCUPATION TO INTERIM ACCORDS: ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN
TERRITORIES 74-79 (1997) (reviewing the legal system as derived from the different periods).
For a quaint colonial description of the mandatory legal system, see WILLIAM BURDICK, THE
BENCH AND BAR OF OTHER LANDS 522-37 (1939).
39 See Assaf Likhovski, The Invention of "Hebrew Law" in Mandatory Palestine, 46 AM.
J. COMP. L. 339, 343 (1998).
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to the Turkish Courts."40 Use of these courts became "less regular"41 in the
1920's and wound down after 1948.42 By then only traditional Rabbinical
Courts and institutional arbitration lay outside the state court system.
Under the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, the PA
decreed that laws in force prior to 1967 would be valid in the Gaza Strip, the
Jericho area, and all other areas that come under PA control in the future, until
unification of the laws is complete.43
A further difficulty of the Court system in PA territories is the split in the
legal system between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.44 "Decisions of the High
Court of Justice in Gaza do not bind lower-level courts in the West Bank, just
as the Court of Appeals in Ramallah cannot bind lower-level courts in Gaza."
5
Two discrete legal systems in the West Bank and Gaza give rise to a "lack of
unity in the courts and legal confusion," both impeding any type of effective
court relief.46
The WBG systems of law fail to grant foreign investors the clarity, legal
guarantees and incentives that modem investors have come to expect. Chief
Justice Khalil Silwani, West Bank High Court of Appeals, noted "[o]ur law is
based partially on what was left behind from the Ottoman Period. The
40 Norman Bentwich, The Application of Jewish Law in Palestine, 9 J. CoMP. LEGIS. &
INT'LL (3d. Ser.) 59,65(1927). Bentwich suggests that immediately after the ouster of the
Ottomans "[it] was as rare for Jewish parties who were in dispute about a matter of civil or
commercial law to take a case to the Courts of the Palestine Administration as it had been to
take it before the War to the Ottoman courts." Id. at 66 (suggesting that a distinctive Jewish
jurisprudence is evolving from the Hebrew Courts of Arbitration). Rose suggests that "a
distinctive Jewish Jurisprudence is evolving from those courts." Rose, supra note 38, at 247.
41 Similar "nationalist" attitudes fueled the use of arbitration in 1 9 1h century Poland
under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. See e.g., RETrR. LUDWlKOWSKi, IREGULAcJEHANDLUI
BIZNESU MIEDZYNAR-ODOWEGO [REGULATION MARKETING AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS]
125 (1996).
42 Likhovski supra note 39 at 345-47 & n.30.
43 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-PLO, 33 I.L.M.
622 [hereinafter Gaza-Jericho Agreement]. For the most comprehensive review of the
sources of Palestinian law, see Anis F. Kassim, Legal Systems and Developments in
Palestine, 1 PALESTINIAN YEARBOOK OFINTERNATIONALLAW 19, 19-35 (1984). For a review
of the West Bank court system before the intifada, see RAJA SHEHADA, THE WESTBANK AND
THE RULE OFLAW, 13-51 (Int'l Comm'n Of Jurists, 1980); A more up to date version can be
found in Raja Shehada, Occupier's Law, 78-101 (Inst. for Palestine Stud., 1985). For a
partial list of Palestine Mandate laws, see generally MOSES DOUKAN, O.B.E. ED., LAWS OF
PALESTINE 1926 - 1931 (L.M. Rotenberg, Tel-Aviv 1932); LEON ROTENBERG, ED., LAWS OF
PALESTINE 1934 - 1935 (L.M. Rotenberg ed., 1936).
44 See Qayyum & Rasmussen, supra note 26, at 25.
45 Id. at 26. Decisions of the courts in the West Bank cannot be appealed in Gaza, just as
court decisions in Gaza cannot be appealed in Ramallah. See id.
46 Id.
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Jordanians have repealed these laws and enacted new ones. We are the only
small piece of land which still uses [them] .,,4
As one World Bank consultant asked, "[t]he vital question is whether the
mix of Turkish, British, Egyptian, Israeli and Jordanian laws inherent in the
Palestinian territories can be forged into a coherent, hospitable commercial
code for foreign investors or is the problem still political. ' 48
Just what are Palestine's arbitration rules regarding international
commercial agreements?49 In Gaza, the PA administers the British Mandatory
Arbitration Ordinance of 1926,50 which is based almost entirely on the English
Arbitration Act of 1889,51 "with pre-1967 legislation by the Egyptian governors
and the Gaza Assembly, and PNA enactments."" In "Jericho .... the PNAadministers pre-1967 Jordanian law, with PNA enactments." 53 And "in the
47 Interview with Chief Justice Khalil Silwani, West Bank High Court ofAppeals, IPCRI
L. & DEv. PROGRAM BULL. (Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information, Jerusalem,
Israel), Summer 1995, at 3 ("address[ing] the benefits and possibilities of Israeli-Palestinian
legal exchange and cooperation").
48 Moustafa Ahmed Moustafa, The Political Economy of the Peace Process in a
Changing Middle East 49 (United Nations University, World Institute for Development
Studies No. 8, Dec. 1995).
49 This raises the issue of just what are Palestinian domestic rules of arbitration. Do the
operative Jordanian statutes - Jordanian Law No. 18 of 1953 regarding arbitration and
Jordanian Law No. 8 of 1952 regarding enforcement of foreign judgments, and the laws
under the British Mandate: Law No. 9 of 1926 regarding arbitration and Order No. 674 of
1930 regarding Foreign Arbitration Awards, apply as the domestic rules? See text infra at
pp. 200-04 for a discussion of the New York Convention's effect on the Geneva Convention
of 1927 noted in Order No. 674. See generally SHEHADEH, supra note 38, 74-79 (reviewing
the legal system as derived from the different periods). For a quaint colonial description of
the Mandatory legal system, see WILLIAM BURDICK, THE BENCH AND BAR OF OTHER LANDS
522-37 (1939).
50 See ROBERT HARRY DRAYTON, THE LAWS OF PALESTINE, ch. 6 Arbitration 40 (1934);
DOUKHAN, supra note 43, at 163; Daniel Kalman, Adv., Recommendations for Improvement
of Contract Enforcement Procedure in the Palestinian Territories, in COMMERCIAL
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 47,50 (5 IPCRI Commercial Law
Reports Series 1997) [hereinafter "Enforcement"].
51 Arbitration Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., ch. 49 (Eng.); see also Enforcement, supra note
50, at 50.
52 PATRICK MEAGHER ET AL., COMMERCIAL LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE WEST BANK AND
GAZA, 5 (Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector Country Report No. 18,
1995); Enforcement, supra note 50, at 50.
53 MEAGHER ET AL., supra note 52, at 5. Jordanian Law No. 18 of 1953 (West Bank) and
Law No. 9 of 1926 (Gaza). See, RICHARD MEEDS, Vol. 1, BUSINESS LAWS OFJORDAN (1998),
for an English translation of the Arbitration Act, Jordanian Law No. 18 of 28 December 1952
(Official Gazette No. 1131 dated 17 January 1953).
The legal structure for the encouragement of foreign investment in the Gaza Strip and Jericho
prior to the Israeli withdrawal is equally nontransparent. According to Molkner the "legal
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West Bank .... the Israeli Civil Administration applies... pre-1967 Jordanian
law ... [and some] Military Orders."54
A. Jordanian Law of 1953
Jordanian arbitration laws passed in 1953 govern the West Bank. The laws
are Law No. 18 of 1953 regarding arbitration (the "Arbitration Law")55 and
Law No. 8 of 1953 regarding enforcement of foreign judgments (the "EFJ"). 56
They are a "scarce improvement" over the mandatory ordinances.
5 7
The Arbitration Law provides that "an arbitration agreement may not be
revoked except with the consent of the parties thereto or the approval of the
Court."5 8 The Arbitration Law provides that every action brought by the
provision of this Law "shall be filed with the court., 59 The "arbitration
agreement may not be revoked without the consent of the parties or the
structure consisted of: [Jordanian Temporary Law No. 1 for 1967: The Encouragement of
Capital Investment Law], two Israeli military orders: The Encouragement of Capital
Investment, Military Order 1055 of June 17, 1991 (Gaza District) (Isr.), and The
Encouragement of Capital Investment, Military Order 1342 of July 7, 1991 (Judea and
Samaria) (Isr.)], and a set of policy directives issued by the Israeli Civil Administration in
the West Bank: The Encouragement of Investment Act (as amended 21 November 1991);
Civil Administration of Judea & Samaria (Judea and Samaria) and Unnumbered Directives
on The Encouragement of Foreign Investment." Molkner, supra note 1, at 1432 & nn. 37-
39. "These laws, orders, and directives relied on discretionary decision-making and heavy
administrative control while granting insufficient incentives and legal guarantees to
investors." Id. at 143.
54 MEAGHER El AL., supra note 52, at 5. The administrative and legal framework in which
the Military Administration operated is described in Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and
Problems of the Israeli Military Government - the Initial Stage, in MILITARY GOVERNMENT
IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980, vol. 1, 22-31 (Meir Shamgar ed.,
1982). Since that time over 1200 military orders have been promulgated. Raja Shehada, The
Legislative Stages of the Israeli Military Occupation in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 151-168 (Emma Playfair ed., Oxford U. Press
1992). For a discussion of changes in Israeli law pursuant to military orders, see V. EYAL
BENVENISTI, LEGAL DUALISM: THE ABSORPTION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES INTO ISRAEL
33-39 (Westview Press, 1990).
55 See ABDUL HAMID EL-AHDAB, ARBITRATION WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES 239 (2d ed.
1999) ("The Jordanian Arbitration Law of 1953 ... repealed the old Palestinian Act of 1933
(as modified in 1946) and also the Arbitral Proceedings of 1935").
56 See The Law of Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Law No. 8 (1952) (Jordan),
reprinted in Law of Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, THE BUSINESS LAWS OF JORDAN,
supra, note 53.
57 Kalman, supra note 50. The Arbitration Law "was influenced largely by the old
English arbitration law... [It] kept the main features of the previous act which had been
issued during the British mandate of Palestine." EL-AHDAB, supra note 55, at 239.
58 The Arbitration Law No. 18 of 1952, art 6, supra note 53.
59 Id. art. 3.
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approval of the court" and "shall have the force of a court judgment in all
respects." 60 The Jordanian Court recognizes arbitration agreements and when
requested by a party, shall issue an injunction suspending court proceedings
where the parties have previously agreed to arbitration, provided the court is
satisfied that the party requesting the suspension will move ahead with the
arbitration and there are no reasons precluding the transfer to arbitration. 61 The
court may, in the following situations, set aside an arbitration award:
(1) If it was based on a void arbitration agreement, or was issued after the
expiry of the period fixed for delivery thereof, or if the arbitrator has acted
ultra vires;
(2) If either party to the arbitration, the umpire or any arbitrator did not have
full capacity, such as being a minor or under legal restraints; or
(3) If the award was delivered by arbitrators who were not duly appointed,
or if the award was delivered by some of the arbitrators without being
authorized to deliver the judgment in the absence of the others.62
"[T]he Court may endorse an arbitration award if it is evident that the
respondent was fully served and has failed to submit an objection within the
prescribed time limit."63 Once endorsed by the court, the award "shall be
executed in the same manner as any court judgment or decision."' The
Arbitration Law shall also apply to arbitrations to which the government is
party.65Jordan's 1952 Law on the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 66 defines
foreign judgments as "every judgment passed by a court outside the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan concerning civil procedures and entailing the payment of a
sum of money.., including the arbitrators' award if the award is, by force of
law, capable of being enforced as a court's judgment in the country where the
arbitration occurred." 67 A foreign award may be enforced by filing an
application before the aps ropriate court and providing a certified copy, in
Arabic, of the judgment. The court may dismiss a petition requesting the
enforcement of a foreign judgment if (i) "the court which passed judgment was
not a competent court;" (ii) the court did not have personal jurisdiction; (iii)
proper service was not effected; (iv) the judgment was obtained by fraud; (v)
the judgment is not final; or (vi) "the cause of action is contrary to public policy
60 Id. art. 4.
61 Id. art. 6.
62 Id. art. 13.
63 Id. art. 16.
64 Id. art. 17.
65 Id. art. 20.
66 The Law of Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, supra note 53.
67 Id. art. 2.
6' Id. art. 3.
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or public morals. 69 Jordan has a requirement of reciprocity and may "dismiss a
petition requesting the enforcement of a foreign judgment passed by a court of
any country whose laws prohibit the enforcement of judgments passed by the
Court of Jordan. 7 °
Both law No. 8 and No. 18 are still in use in Jordan today. However, a
draft commercial arbitration act "the Jordan bill" is currently under review by
Jordanian authorities.7 '
Jordan was one of the first Arab States to sign and ratify the Arab
Convention on the Enforcement of Judgments.72 Jordan is also party to two
standard international arbitration conventions: the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of other
States, as well as the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.73 The EFJ is consonant with the NY
Convention.
B. British Law
After two years as a military occupation force, Britain assumed the
Mandate for Palestine in 1923. 74 The British began to revamp the Ottoman law
in a variety of areas including the procedure and recognition of arbitrations. 75
Since 1926 the arbitration laws operative in the Mandate (and even now in
Gaza) consists of the following: (i) Law No. 9 of 1926,76 (ii) Law No. 14 of
71 781928, and (iii) Law No. 30 of 1934. His Majesty's Government adhered, onbehalf of Palestine, to the Protocol on Arbitration Clauses in Commercial
69 Id. art. 7.
70 Id. art. 8.
71 See EL-AHDAB, supra note 55, at 267.
72 Id., at 240.
73 See discussion infra Part IV for a discussion of these conventions.
74 See Terms of the British Mandate for Palestine confirmed by the Council of the League
of Nations, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 25
(Ruth Lapidoth & Moshe Hirsch eds., 1992) (providing that agreement entered into force on
Sept. 29, 1923); See also DAVID FROMKIN, A PEACE TO END ALL PEACE 518-26 (1989)
(providing background leading up to Britain's acceptance of the mandate).
75 The relevant clauses of the Ottoman law or Mejelle regarding arbitration can be found
in THE MEJELLE, vol. 16, Chapter IV, sections 1841-1851, 325-26 (3d ed., 1980). See also
Bentwich, supra note 36, at 67. See also Kassim, supra note 43, at 20-21 for a general
discussion of the Ottoman law background to Mandate Law.
76 Arbitration Ordinance, March 11, 1926 Official Gazette, 1925, 622; 1926, 117.,
reprinted in LAWS OF PALESTINE, supra note 43.
77 DRAYTON, supra note 50 at 40-45.
78 Id.
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Agreements signed at Geneva on the September 24, 1923,7 9 and on March 12,
1926, the instrument was filed with the League of Nations and the accession
took effect.80 The primary focus of the Geneva Protocol was to require
enforcement of arbitration agreements. 81 The Geneva Protocol also addressed
the enforcement of awards, but only within the state where such awards were
82made. The Geneva Convention extended the Geneva Protocol to the
Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 to require enforcement of
awards rendered pursuant to the Geneva Protocol within any contracting state.83
Britain, on behalf of Palestine, signed the Geneva Convention.
84
Under Mandatory law foreign awards are discussed in the Arbitration
(Foreign Awards) Act, 193085 which provides that foreign arbitration awards
subject to the provisions of the Act will be enforceable. 86 These awards will be
treated as "binding for all purposes on the persons as between whom it was
made, and may accordingly be relied on by any of those persons by way of
defense, set off or otherwise in any legal proceedings in England." 87 For a
foreign award to be enforced, it must have (i) been made in pursuance of a
valid agreement for arbitration; (ii) been made by the tribunal named in the
agreement; (iii) been made in conformity with the law governing the
arbitration; (iv) become final in the country where it was made; and (v) been a
matter that could be lawfully arbitrated under the law of England.
The purpose of the Geneva Convention of 1927 was to widen the scope of
the Geneva Protocol by providing for the recognition and enforcement of
arbitration awards pursuant to the Geneva Protocol within the territory of any
contracting state, rather than only the state where the award was made. 89 ,The
Geneva Protocol and [the Geneva] Convention were major early steps towards
an effective international framework for commercial arbitration," 9 and were
79 See Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1923,27 L.N.T.S.
157 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol].
80 Id.
81 See id., at 158-59.
82 See id.
83 Arbitration (Foreign Awards Act, 1930 at 2451 (1930) [hereinafter Foreign Awards
Act]; Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. I, Sept. 26, 1927, 92
L.N.T.S. 301, 305 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
84 See Geneva Convention, supra note 83, at 303.
85 Id. at2451.
86 See Foreign Awards Act, supra note 83.
87 Id. at 2452.
88 See id.
89 Geneva Convention, art. I, supra note 83, at 305; see also GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (1994).
90 Born, supra note 89, at 17. For a helpful explanation of the 1923 Protocol and 1927
Convention see John Collier and Vaughn Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International
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both succeeded by the New York Convention of 1958. The New York
Convention provides that both the Geneva Convention and Protocol "shall
cease to have effect between Contracting States on their becoming bound and
to the extent they become bound, by this Convention." 91 Great Britain is party
to the New York Convention and by so doing is no longer party to the Geneva
Convention.
IV. OVERVIEW OF STANDARDS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
The standards in international commercial arbitration have been largely
defined by international agreements and rules.92 The agreements take several
forms, including conventions and bilateral treaties, and the rules can be invoked
in institutional or ad hoc arbitration proceedings.93 The most effective
mechanism for developing a standard in international commercial arbitration
has been the ratification, by individual countries, of international conventions.
The United Nations has been very influential in developing such
conventions. Most notably, it sponsored the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which has been
signed by over 121 countries.94 Recognizing that domestic laws on arbitration
are generally unsatisfactory for the resolution of international disputes, the U.N.
developed additional mechanisms to further define the standards: it sponsored
Law, 55-6 (1999). See also Paolo Contini, International Commercial Arbitration: The
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 287-90 (1959).
91 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, art. VII, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. See
ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 63 & n.30 (2d ed. 1997) ("[T]he Geneva treaties are now only relevant for
arbitral awards made in Portugal or Mauritius."); Susan Choi, Judicial Enforcement of
Arbitration Awards Under the ICSID and New York Conventions, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 175 (1996) (noting that the New York Convention was drafted specifically to replace
the 1927 Geneva Convention).
92 See generally INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS
"JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY? (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower eds., 1994)
("There was much cross-fertilization in drafting theserules: ICC experience was well-known
to those who prepared ICSID Rules; experts in ICSID and ICC cases helped draft
UNCITRAL Rules; and, in turn, UNCITRAL's approach strongly influenced LCIA and AAA
international Rules").
93 See GLOBAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION: A GUIDE TO AGREEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS
413 (Bernard Colas ed., 1994) [hereinafter GLOBAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION]. For a general
discussion of the various mechanisms that are used in international commercial arbitration,
see generally CHRISTIAN BOHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 45-55 (1996) (discussing types of international commercial arbitration); REDERN,
supra note 91, at 39-69 (providing an overview of different types of international
arbitration); GLOBAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION, supra, at 408-22.
94 New York Convention, supra note 91.
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the United Nations Comiission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL")
Rules95 and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration.96 These international commercial arbitration mechanisms have
allowed the development of international standards, recognized and accepted
by foreign investors and businessmen worldwide. While the PA cannot
currently be party to the majority of these agreements,97 it should be familiar
with the significant conventions and models in order to evaluate its laws and
amend them accordingly.
A. Conventions
The New York Convention has been described as the "most important
international treaty relating to international commercial arbitration." 98 This
convention sets out the enforcement and jurisdiction aspects of international
commercial arbitration99 and ensures the recognition of arbitral awards by
excluding any review of the merits of foreign awards and limiting the grounds
for refusal to recognize and enforce the award. 10 Only states may be party to
95 "UNCITRAL adopted Arbitration Rules in 1976, Conciliation Rules in 1980, [and]
Guidelines for Administering Arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in 1982..
.. One of UNCITRAL's specific objectives is the promotion of the New York Convention."
REDFERN, supra note 91, at 479. "Membership is restricted to states." Id.
96 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration (1985) was designed for use by "States with different legal, social
and economic systems in order to contribute to the development of harmonious international
economic relations." G.A. Res. 4/72, U.N. GAOR, 4 0 th Sess., 1 1 2 th mtg, at 308, U.N. Doc.
A/40/935 (1985). The Model Law is designed to be used together with the New York
Convention and the UNCITRAL Rules on arbitration to "significantly contribute to the
establishment of a unified legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement of disputes
arising in international commercial relations." Id. See generally Holtzman and Neuhaus,
GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(Kluwer 1989); Broches, COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Kluwer 1990).
97 See infra pp. 224-28.
98 REDFERN, supra note 91, at 63.
99 New York Convention, art. II, supra note 91. The parties to the Convention agree to:
"(i) recognize an agreement in writing," and "(ii) to submit ... all or any differences to
arbitration... [for] settlement." Id. art. II. "The term 'Agreement in Writing' shall include
an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement." Id. The Convention sets out that
"[t]he court of a Contracting State... shall.., refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds
the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed." Id..
100 See id. art V. The Convention includes two reservations: (i) a state may decide to
apply the Convention only to awards made in other Contracting States, and (ii) a state may
decide that it will apply the Convention only to matters involving commercial law. See id.
art. I.
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this Convention. 10 Because Palestine is not considered to be a state, it is
ineligible to be party to the New York Convention at this time.1°2
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States ("ICSID") provides for arbitration between
World Bank member states and nationals of member states.103 ICSID
Arbitration proceedings are insulated in all contracting states from any judicial
101 As of April 1999, 121 states were party to the convention, including 10 states in the
Middle East: Jordan, Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, Kuwait, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi
Arabia and Israel, each of which has ratified the Convention. Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), UNCITRAL Home Page
www.un.or.atluncitral/status/.htm visited Aug. 29, 2000. See also
www.internationalADR.com visited Aug. 29, 2000.
102 See discussion pp. 224-28. In June of 1998, the New York Convention recognized its
40th anniversary. The passage of time has also seen enforcement of foreign awards through
mechanisms other than the New York Convention, including the passage of international
commercial arbitration acts. The New York Convention was not intended to prevail "where
national rules or... other treaties... are more favourable to enforcement," or replace legal
systems or prevent national laws from expanding enforcement beyond that New York
Convention. Jan Paulsson, Rediscovering the N.Y. Convention: Further Reflections on
Chromalloy, MEALEY'S INT'LARB. REP., Apr. 1997, at 20.
103 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
[hereinafter ICSID Convention]. The ICSID Convention established the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes [hereinafter ICSID]. Id. at 162. ICSID was sponsored
by the World Bank "to facilitate the settlement of investment disputes between governments
and foreign investors.., to promote increased flows of international investment." The World
Bank Group, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, About ICSID
(visited Mar. 4,2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/main.htm>.; See Ibrahim
F.I. Shihata, The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Investment: The Role of The
World Bank, with Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA, 1 AM. U. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 97
(1986), for a discussion of the World Bank's role in ICSID and MIGA. For an analysis of
the effectiveness of ICSID arbitration, see Malcolm D. Rowat, Multilateral Approaches to
Improving the Investment Climate of Developing Countries: The Cases ofICSID and MIGA,
33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 103, 105-18 (1992); REDFERN supra note 91 at 47.
Ratification of the ICSID Convention is not an obligation to use ICSID as a mechanism to
settle a dispute, use of the Convention is within the sole discretion of each contracting state.
See Georges R. Delaume, Should Investment in the Third World be Internationally
Protected? What Role for the United Nations, 79 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 378, 383
(1985).
As of October 1, 1999, the ICSID Convention had been signed by 149 countries, 131 of
which have ratified the convention, including numerous Arab States: Algeria, Bahrain,
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, and Tunisia. See World Bank Group, ICSID: List of
Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (visited Aug. 29, 2000)
<http://www.worldbank.orglicsidlconstate/c-states-en.htmi>; International ADR, ICSID
Signatories at www.internationalADR.com, visited Aug. 29, 2000.
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control or intervention, protecting both the investor and the contracting state.104
Not being a sovereign state, 05 Palestine is not party to the ICSID Convention.
In 1978 ICSID established the "Additional Facility" to extend the
Convention to parties who were not member states.l°6 Although the Additional
Facility allows arbitration for parties that are not member states, it only allows
arbitration between a state or a national of a state.t°7 Theoretically the PA could
have access to the Additional Facility through Israel; however this is not
practical. In effect, because Palestine is not a sovereign state, it does not have
access to ICSID's Additional Facility
B. Models
The aim of the UNCITRAL Rules10 8 is "to establish a procedural
framework" for arbitration which will "ensure a general international
acceptance" of the arbitration result, particularly under the New York
Convention. 10 9 The Rules were designed to be equally "acceptable... in the
North, South, East and West," and were unanimously adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in December 1976.110 Parties do not need to be
a member of UNCITRAL to apply UNCITRAL Rules. 1
104 Insertion of an ICSID clause is widely used in many Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BITs), national investment laws and codes, as well as individual agreements. Rowat, supra
note 103, at 118.
105 See discussion pp. 224-28.
106 The Additional Facility was sponsored by the World Bank to "facilitate foreign private
investment by providing a dependable dispute resolution mechanism that would be
acceptable both to host governments and foreign investors." See Rowat, supra note 103, at
118 fn 62. The World Bank's involvement in the development of the WBG, as an area
separate from any member state, dates back to 1992. At which time the World Bank was
asked to conduct an in-depth assessment of the development needs of select economies of the
Middle East Region, including the WBG. Shihata, supra note 103.
107 See World Bank Group, ICSID Additional Facility, Rules Governing the Additional
Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (Additional Facility Rules) (visited April 2,2000)
<http://www.worldbank.orglicsid/facility/3.htm>.
'0' The UNCITRAL Rules [hereinafter Rules] were promulgated by the General Assembly
of the United Nations in December 1966. See Report of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law on the Work of its Eighteenth Session, U.N. GAOR 4 0 'h Sess.
Supp. (No. 17) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985).
109 REDFERN, supra note 91, at 480.
110 Id.
111 See Gerold Herrman, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Law: A Good Model of a Model
Law, 3 UNIFORM L. STUD. 483, 484 (1998).
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The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
(1985)1 12 reflects a worldwide consensus on the principles and important issues
of the practice of international commercial arbitration. The Model Law was
designed for use by States with "different legal, social and economic systems"
to contribute to the development of harmonious international economic
relations and to help establish "a unified legal framework for the fair and
efficient settlement of disputes arising in international commercial relations."'
1 3
The Model Law covers all stages of the arbitral process, beginning with the
arbitration agreement and ending with the recognition and enforcement of the
arbitral award."'
The Model Law is a model that nations can use in its entirety or as a guide.
As a guide, the Model law provides internationally accepted principles relating
to the support for, and control of, arbitration by national courts. At present, it is
unlikely that any country introducing new legislation relating to arbitration will
do so without first examining the text of the Model Law." 5 Even when the state
does not adopt the Model Law in toto, it will adopt a similar format to make its
own law more accessible and transparent to foreign lawyers."
6
112 For the text of the Model Law, see United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. GAOR 40th Sess., Supp.
(No. 17), Annex I, at 81, U.N. Doc A/40/17 (1985) [hereinafter Model Law], reprinted in
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985).
"1 Id.
114 Model Law, supra note 112, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1302.
115 See Herrman, supra note 111, at 484-85. "[Mlore than one quarter of the world's
territory is covered by enactments based on the UNCITRAL Model... and more countries
are to follow." Id. at 485.
116 Cf. REDFERN, supra note 91, at 525. The Model law can be adopted with
accompanying modifications, as was the case with Egypt when it promulgated their new
Arbitration act, Law No. 27/1994. See Gerold Herrman, Does the World Need Additional
Uniform Legislation on Arbitration?, 15 ARB. INT'L 211, 212-13 (1999). Today, Cairo is
emerging rapidly as a center of Arab business and money, perhaps due in part to enacting the
Model Law. Cf EL-AHDAB, supra note 55, at 157.
Thirty-seven countries and states have enacted legislation based on the Model Law.
UNCITRAL Home Page, Current Status on Conventions and Model Laws
<http:llwww.un.or.atluncitrallstatus/htm> visited April 1, 1999. Legislation based on
UNCITRAL Model Law has been enacted in Australia, Bahrain, Bermuda, Bulgaria, Canada,
Cyprus, Egypt, Germany, Guatemala, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Hungary,
India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Kenya, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand,
Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Russian Federation, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Ukraine, within the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Scotland; within the United States of
America: California, Connecticut, Oregon and Texas; and Zimbabwe. Id.
"The Model Law, its language and structure did exert a strong influence" in the drafting of
the 1996 English Arbitration Act. William A. Park, The New English Arbitration Act,
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., June 1998, at 22 (noting that England's new Arbitration Act took
effect in 1997).
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While states adopting the Model Law can modify it to cover both domestic
and international arbitration, the Model Law was specifically designed for
international commercial arbitration.' 17 The Model Law provides those
countries without a modem arbitration law with a complete system of
arbitration that is in harmony with the international community. There are
"Model Law countries in all continents, of all sizes and all stages of economic
development, covering altogether more than one quarter of the world's
territory.,,
118
The U.N. Secretariat recently stated: "It is apparent that any State, if it
were to follow the Model Law closely in drafting its new arbitration law, would
be in very good company, would benefit from that company, would give yet
another, and probably the clearest, signal of having joined the global league of
nations with a hospitable legal climate and infrastructure for international
commercial arbitration.'" An entity does not, however, have to be a state to
adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law, thus, the PA is free to adopt the Model Law
in toto or use it as a guide.
V. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ACTS AND INVESTMENT LAWS IN
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
To facilitate economic development, Palestine should now be exploring
the mechanisms and techniques developed in legal reform efforts elsewhere to
see if they may be useful as models for Palestine in the reformation of its
arbitration laws. 12 Because of both direct influence and a common foreign
influence, Egypt and Jordan have, or had, legal processes, which closely
resemble those in the WBG. l12 Both Egypt and Jordan have begun structural
legal reform efforts, which have included reforms in international commercial122
arbitration. Egypt has a relatively new International Commercial Arbitration
Act, which adopts the Model Law with minor alterations, 123 and Jordan passed
117 See Model Law, supra note 112, art. 1 ("[T]his law applies to international commercial
arbitration").
118 Herrman, supra note 115, at 212.
119 See id., at 492. See also Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, Developing Countries viv-a-vis
International Arbitration, 3 J. of Int'l Arb. 21 (1996) (stating that "developing countries
seem to need arbitration, at least as much as developed countries, in order to settle their
international disputes.")
120 See Institute for the Study and Development of Legal Systems, The Development of the
Palestinian Civil and Criminal Justice Processes 7 (March 1995) (unpublished, on file with
authors).
121 Hiram E. Chodosh and Stephen A. Mayo, The Palestinian Legal Study: Consensus and
Assessment of the New Palestinian Legal System, 38 HARV. INT'L L. J. 375, 394 (1997).
122 See id.
123 See Abdul Hamid EI-Ahdab, Enforcing Foreign Awards in the Middle East, in
COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST 323, 336 (Hilary Lewis & Chibli Mallat eds., 1995)
(discussing the UNCITRAL Model Law).
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an Encouragement of Investment law in 1995 and is currently reviewing its
international commercial arbitration laws. 124 Many Arab states are in the
process of modernizing their laws.125 Examining the international commercial
arbitration laws in neighboring Arab countries, as well as the countries outside
the region, allows the PA to learn from its experience as well as help the PA to
create a law that meets both global and regional standards.
A. Egypt
In 1994, Egypt enacted a new arbitration act, Law on Arbitration in Civil
and Commercial Matters (the "New Law"), 126 bringing its arbitration laws
within international standards. Due, at least in part, to its new arbitration act,
Egypt has experienced increased foreign investment. 127 The New Law largely
124 See EL-AHDAB, supra note 55, at 267.
125 "[T]he future of Arab law... depends on its ability to comprehend and to adapt to the
social and economic realities whose symmetry worldwide has become increasingly evident."
GEORGE N. SEFIR, MODERNIZATION OF THE LAW IN ARAB STATES 16 (1998).
126 The Law Concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters, (1994) (Egypt)
[hereinafter New Egyptian Law]. For commentary on the 1994 arbitration law, see generally
Amazu A. Asouzo, The Egyptian Law Concerning Arbitration in Civil and Criminal Matters,
AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L., Mar. 1996, 139; Mohiedin I. Alamedin, Arbitration in Egypt, 18
COMP. L. Y.B. INT'L Bus. 81, 81 (1996) (discussing the notable provisions of the law and
their effect). "Egypt [was] the first country in the Arab Middle East to . .. [draft] an
arbitration law based on the UNCITRAL model." Michael H. Davies, The Draft Arbitration
Law in Egypt, 3 ARAB L.Q. 119, 120 (1988).
127 See EL-AHDAB, supra note 55, at 157 ("[M]ost foreign investors were waiting for an
arbitration act which enabled them to settle by way of arbitration any disputes as to their
investment . . . . [I]nvestments were waiting for its issuance."); see also Michael
Avramovich, The Protection of International Investment at the Start of the Twenty-First
Century: Will Anachronistic Notions of Business Render Irrelevant the OECD's
Multinational Agreement on Investment?, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1201, 1237 n. 200
(quoting from Amy Dockser Marcus, Egypt Quickly Turns An Investment Famine into Times
of Plenty, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1997, at Al ("Just a few years ago, [Egypt] had negligible
foreign reserves, a huge budget deficit and no willing lenders. Today, foreign reserves
exceed $19 billion, the budget deficit is less than 1% of gross domestic product, and inflation
is under control. Egypt now has an investment-grade rating from Standard and Poor's, and it
recently told the International Monetary Fund that it has no need to drawn [sic] on a line of
credit available under an IMF agreement. U.S. companies, from Microsoft Corp. to
McDonald's Corp., have set up shop... [and] tourism is booming").) We should not, of
course, neglect the effect of Egypt's foreign investment law. Cf. JESWALD W. SALACUSE,
Foreign Investment and Legislative Exemptions in Egypt: Needed Stimulus in New
Capitalizations?, in SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLEEAST (Lawrence 0.
Michalek & Jeswald W. Salacuse, eds., 1986) (providing that Egypt's 1974 and 1977
Investment law). For a discussion of the modernization of Egypt's civil justice process, see
Hiram E. Chodosh et al., Egyptian Civil Justice Process Modernization: A Functional and
Systemic Approach, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 865 (1996) (noting the need for modernization of
legal processes to resolve commercial disputes when there is increased trade).
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tracks the UNCITRAL Model Law. 128 Egypt has also ratified the New York
Convention, ICSID and the Convention of 1974 on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between the Arab States and the Nationals of other
States. 129
The New Law differs from the Model Law in several areas. The New Law
applies to arbitrations having venue in Egypt as well as those taking place
abroad where the parties have agreed to Egyptian Law, and to both domestic
and international arbitrations.
130
The arbitration is considered international when the subject matter of the
arbitration agreement relates to international commerce, the parties are not from
the same state; the parties agree to refer their arbitration to a "permanent
arbitration organization," whether in or outside Egypt; the subject matter is
linked to more than one state; or the designated place of arbitration or the place
most closely linked to the dispute is outside Egypt.131 To be enforced, the
agreement must be in writing, If there is a settlement during the arbitration,
the arbitral tribunal shall, at the parties' request, terminate the proceedings. 133
This settlement must be included in the arbitral award.134
The language of the New Law leads to the determination that Egyptian
courts, when examining awards for leave to enforce "are not bound by the
decisions of the courts of the country where the award was made, or under
whose law the award was made." 135 Under Egyptian law a relevant court will
enforce a foreign award unless (i) the period for bringing an action to invalidate
the award as set forth below has not expired, (ii) the award contradicts a
judgment previously issued by the Egyptian courts on the matter in dispute, (iii)
the award has not been validly served on the party against whom it was made,
128 See Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the Arab Countries,
11 ARB. INT'L 169, 176 (1995) (discussing the variations in the Egyptian law from the Model
Law).
129 See Sameh Zeazaa & Mohamed A. Ghannam, The Commercial Laws of Egypt, in
DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWS OFTHE WORLD, Rel. 95-1, April 1995, at 57 [hereinafter The
Commercial Laws of Egypt].
130 See New Law supra note 126, art. 1. The reasons behind adopting an arbitration law,
which applies to national and international arbitration are politically based. See EL-AHDAB,
supra note 55, at 157. Egypt did not support returning to what they felt was a " 'mixed
court' system, which was applied in Egypt when it was occupied by the English army." Id.
131 See New Law supra note 126, art. 3.
132 Id. art. 12.
133 Id. art. 41.
'34 See id.
135 The Commercial Laws of Egypt, supra note 129, at 178 (Egypt did not adopt Article
36 of Model Law regarding the setting aside of international arbitration awards).
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or (iv) the award contravenes public order in Egypt. 136 The New Law provides
the award can be set aside if it contravenes public order, whereas the Model
Law provides for setting aside the award if it contravenes internationalpublic
order.137 This would seem to give Egyptian courts a great deal of discretion.
138
Some have interpreted these few changes from the Model Law as a step
backward. 139 Overall however, the New Law is seen as a positive step for the
Egyptian economy and investment in Egypt.
The enactment of the New Law has helped the Cairo Regional Centre for
International Commercial Arbitration become a stronger presence for
arbitration in the Middle East,14° as well as have a positive impact on trade in
136 See id. at 55. Art. 53(1) of the Egyptian Arbitration Act allows for annulment of an
arbitration award, namely (d) if the arbitral award fails to apply the law agreed by the parties
to the subject matter of the dispute. Id. See Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996). In Chromalloy, a $16.2 million (U.S.) award "was
rendered in 1994 against [Egypt], in favor of Chromalloy Aeroservices Inc.." Paulsson,
supra note 102, at 21. Chromalloy "petitioned the U.S. District Court in Washington
[D.C.] for confirmation of the award, whereupon [Egypt] brought an action before the Court
of Appeal of Cairo seeking annulment of the award" based on the argument that the arbitral
tribunal failed to apply the law agreed upon by the parties. Id. Thereafter, the Egyptian
Court set aside the U.S. District Court award. See id. The U.S. Court granted enforcement
of the arbitral award in spite of the Egyptian annulment. See id. ; see also Stephen T.
Ostrowski & Yuval Shany, Note, Chromally: United States Law and International
Arbitration at the Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1650, 1653 (1998).
137 "Public order is the limit of party autonomy and is different in national and
international arbitrations. In national arbitration, one applies national public order
whereas in international arbitration, one applies international public order .... It is
strange that the new Egyptian Arbitration Act, whilst it distinguishes between national and
international arbitration did not grant this distinction the effects which are generally linked
to it in all arbitration acts which make such a distinction."
EL-AHDAB, supra note 55, at 159.
138 However, Egyptian courts have refused jurisdiction where a party has tried to
invalidate an arbitration clause based on Egyptian public policy. The Court of First Instance
refused jurisdiction where a standard ICC arbitration was present in the agreement. See
Davies, supra note 126, at 122. "[T]he Court held that the arbitration clause effectively
ousted the jurisdiction of the Egyptian Courts and rejected an argument as to the invalidity of
the arbitration clause based on the failure of the parties to nominate the arbitrators in the
arbitration clause." Davies, supra note 126, at 122 (discussing a judgment rendered on
January 27, 1987 by the Gaza Court of First Instance). The highest Court of Appeal in
Egypt, the Court of Cassation, "held that the requirements of public policy did not prevent a
dispute from being validly referred to arbitration outside of Egypt governed by procedural
rules different form the Egyptian procedural rules." Id. (discussing the decision of April 15,
1956).
139 See El-Ahdab, supra note 128, at 176 (discussing the differences in the Model Law and
Egyptian New Law).
140 See The Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA)
(visited Jan. 21, 2000) <http:/ www.crcica.org.eg/crcica98.htm>. It is expected that 200
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Egypt. Legal scholars and practitioners in Egypt are currently participating in
round table discussions regarding the status of Egypt's new arbitration law and
the effect of the changes made from the UNCITRAL Model Law."'
In 1982, Egypt signed a bilateral investment treaty with the United States,
which entered into force in 1992.142 This treaty defines the rights of individual
investors with respect to their investments in the other contracting country and
protects their ability to secure arbitration in a neutral forum. 143
B. Jordan Post 1953
In 1989, Jordan began its economic reform program, with a concentration
on trade liberalization. In an effort to create a friendly investment environment,
Jordan continued the reform in 1995 with new and amended laws.
On September 16, 1995, the Jordanian parliament approved the Law for
the Promotion of Investment. 144 This law applies to investments, by non-
Jordanians, in the Kingdom. Law No. 16, Art 33 provides for the settlement of
investment disputes:
Investment disputes between an Investor of foreign capital and Jordanian
Government corporations shall be amicably settled. If no such settlement is
reached within a period not exceeding six months, any party to the dispute
may bring court action or refer the matter for adjudication before the
'International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes' for its
settlement by arbitration or conciliation in accordance with the 'Agreement
for Settlement of Investment Disputes between Countries and Nationals of
other Countries' signed by the Kingdom. 
45
cases will have been filed with the Centre by the end of 1999. Mohie Eldin I. & Alman
Eiden, ARBITRAL A WARDS OF THE CAIRO REGIONAL CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, vii (Kluwer 2000). For a description of the CRCICA's objectives, scope, role,
ADR measures, fees, and rules, see id. See also, Cairo Centre for Commercial Arbitration
(visited Feb. 9, 2000) <http://www.lac.com.jo/news37.htn>. For an analysis and evaluation
of the Regional Centre, see YvES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 241-431(1996).
141 Letter from Dr. M.I.M. Aboul-Enein, Director, Cairo Regional Centre for International
Commercial Arbitration, to Shelby R. Quast, I (Sept. 30, 1998) (on file with author) (stating
that the round table discussions are still ongoing, but that they "are tending to make the
Egyptian Law more and more patterned on the UNCITRAL Model Law.") For a detailed
discussion of Egypt's new Arbitration Act, see EL-AHDAB, supra note 55, at 155-202.
142 See Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
Sept. 29, 1982, U.S.-Egypt, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-24 (1986), 21 I.L.M. 927, 1982.
141 See id. art. 6.
144 Law for the Promotion of Investment of 1995, Law No. 16 (1995), reprinted in
BUSINESS LAWS OF JORDAN (Feb. 1998).
141 Id. art. 33.
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As of this date, Jordan has not enacted a new arbitration law; the 1952
Laws on Arbitration and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments are still in
* effect. 146 However, Jordan has draft revisions to its commercial arbitration act
on the table.147 The revisions follow certain aspects of the UNCITRAL Model
Law such as the definition of agreement to arbitrate and areas of party
autonomy.148 However, the proposed revision restricts arbitrability to "matters
which may be subject to an amicable settlement."'149 NUNU
In 1997, Jordan entered into a bilateral investment treaty with the United
States. 15 This treaty defines the rights of individual investors with respect to
their investments in the other contracting country and protects their ability to
secure arbitration in a neutral forum.''
C. Israel
The Israeli Arbitration Law was enacted in 1968 and amended in 1974.152
The 1974 amendment addresses foreign arbitral awards. 153 As amended, the
arbitration law provides the Israeli courts with a good deal of discretion over
arbitration agreements and awards. If a dispute with an arbitration clause "is
brought in court .... a party to the action who is a party to the arbitration
agreement applies for a stay of proceedings in the action."'154 The court shall
stay the proceedings between the parties to the agreement, provided the
applicant is prepared to move ahead with the arbitration. 155 However, the court
may refrain from staying the proceeding "if it sees a special reason why the
146 Jordan, however, is in the process of drafting a new arbitration law.
147 See EL-AHDAB, supra note 55, at 267.
148 See id. at 268-76.
149 Id. at 268 ("matters concerning public order, bankruptcy or any dispute of a criminal
character cannot be arbitrated."). EI-Ahdab provides a thorough discussion of the proposed
revisions.
150 See Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment,
July 2, 1997, U.S.-Jordan, 36 I.L.M. 1498.
151 See id. art. 9.
152 Arbitration Law, 5728-1968, passed by the Knesset on the 5th Av, 5728 (30th July,
1968) and published Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 535 of the 15th Av, 5728 (9th August, 1968)
184, as amended by Arbitration (Amendment) Law, 5734-1974, passed by the Knesset on the
12th Tammuz (2nd July, 1974) and published in Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 737 of the 20th
Tammuz, 5734 (10 July 1974) 93, reprinted in 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION IV Israel, 1-17 (Kenneth R. Simmonds ed., 1992) [hereinafter Arbitration
(Amendment) Law]. For a comprehensive review of Israel's arbitration law, see S.
Ottolenghi, Bo rerut Din-Va-Nohal (1991) (in Hebrew).
153 See Arbitration (Amendment) Law, supra note 152.
'54 See id. art. 5(a).
155 Id.
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dispute should not be dealt with by arbitration."' 156 The law, however, does not
define "special reason," but states that where the court decides that a "dispute
shall not be dealt with by arbitration, any stipulation in the agreement between
the parties making the commencement or termination or arbitration a pre-
condition of the realization of a right between them shall be void."' 157
The arbitration law provides that where an action is brought into court in a
dispute which the parties had agreed to refer to arbitration, and an international
convention to which Israel is party applies to the arbitration, and "such
convention lays down provisions for a stay of proceedings," the court shall
exercise its power to stay the proceeding in accordance with and subject to
those provisions.158 The court also has the discretion to, "on the application of a
party who has appointed an arbitrator, appoint that arbitrator, or another person,
as sole arbitrator."' 59 "Where an additional arbitrator or an umpire has been
appointed, whether under the arbitration agreement or by the court, the court
may, on the application of a party, notwithstanding anything contained in the
arbitration agreement, appoint that arbitrator as sole arbitrator if it sees a special
reason for doing so in the interests of instituting or completing the
arbitration."'
160
The Israeli Arbitration Law provides that "an arbitrator shall, in the
arbitration, have the same power of summoning witnesses to give evidence or
produce documents as a court has in an action brought before it, and he may
award remuneration and expenses.'161 The court has the same powers, in
respect to arbitration, as an action brought directly before it to: (i) summon a
witness and determine their remuneration and expenses; (ii) adopt coercive and
punitive measures "against a witness who has not answered a summons of the
arbitrator or of the court or has refused to testify;" (iii) take evidence "forthwith
or out of the jurisdiction;" (iv) substitute "service of notice or documents on the
litigants;" and (v) attach property, prevent departure from Israel, security for the
production of property, the appointment of a receiver, a mandatory injunction
and a prohibitive injunction.
The Israeli law recognizes arbitral decisions as having the same effect as a
decision of the court. 16 3 However, filing "an application with the court in
connection with an arbitration ... shall not stay the arbitration proceedings
unless the court or arbitrator so directs."164
156 Id. art. 5(c).
'.. Id. art. 5 (b).
' Id. art. 6.
'9 Id. art. 8(c).
160 Id. art. 9.
161 Id. art. 13(a).
162 Id. art. 16(b).
163 Id. art. 17(b).
164 Arbitration (Amendment) Law, supra note 152, art. 18.
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The Arbitral Award must be in writing and must "be signed by the
arbitrator, indicating the date of signature."' 65 Unless there is a contrary
provision in the arbitration agreement, "the arbitral award binds the parties and
their successors as resjudicata.',166 The Israeli courts "may, on the application
of a party, confirm an arbitral award." 167 Upon confirmation, the award shall
"be treated as a judgment of the court." r68 The court will not, however,
"entertain opposition to the confirmation of an arbitral award," except via an
application to set it aside.169 The court may only "set aside an award, wholly or
in part, or supplement or amend it, or remit it to the arbitrator" for a number of
defined reasons. 170 The arbitration law further provides that "an application for
the confirmation or setting aside of a foreign arbitral award to which an
international convention applies to which Israel is party and which lays down
provisions as to the [subject] matter in question shall be filed and dealt with in
accordance with and subject to those provisions.' 71 Israel is party to the New
York Convention'1
A review of the Israeli statute suggests that it gives far more discretion to
its own courts than does the UNCITRAL model. In that regard, Israel uses a
'national' model of arbitration rather than the 'a-national' model supported by
the consensus of recent commentators 173 and exemplified by the UNCITRAL
Model Law. To that respect, the Israeli statute lags behind the international
consensus exemplified in the PA draft law we recommend herein.
'65 Id. art. 20.
'66 Id. art. 21.
167 Arbitration (Amendment) Law, supra note 152, art. 23(a).
168 id.
169 Id. art. 23(b).
170 Id. art. 24 (the defined reasons are: (1) the arbitration agreement was not valid; (2) the
award was made by an arbitrator nor properly appointed; (3) the arbitrator acted without
authority or exceeded the authority vested in him by the arbitration committee; (4) a party
was not given a suitable opportunity to state his case or to produce his evidence; (5) the
arbitrator did not determine one of the matters referred to him for determination; (6) the
arbitrator did not assign reasons for the award though the arbitration agreement required him
to do so; (7) the arbitrator did not make the award in accordance with law though the
arbitration agreement required him to do so; (8) the award was made after the period for
making it had expired; (9) the contents of the award are contrary to public policy; and (10) a
ground exists on which a court would have set aside a final, non-appealable judgment.).
171 Arbitration (Amendment) Law, supra note 152, art. 29(A).
172 See New York Convention, supra note 91.
173 For a discussion of the trend toward a national arbitration in furtherance of the goal of
party autonomy, see Hans Smit, A-NationalArbitration, 63 TuLANE L. REv. 629 (1989); see
generally, Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound, Award Detachedform the Law of its Country
of Origin, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 358 (1981).
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VI. THE STATUS OF ARBITRATION IN PALESTINE - RELEVANT PALESTINIAN
LEGISLATION
A. Sulha
Many Arab states, after achieving independence, founded their legal
systems on Western constitutional concepts.174 "Arab societies, however,
[often] continued to practice traditional customary law."'175 Being under the rule
of Israel, Palestinian society "retained the use of customary law even more than
other Arab societies." 176 This was true both for commercial disputes as well as
traditional inter-personal conflicts. Customary law in Palestine is viewed as the
"intermediate state of the road to statehood--a means of linking the mostly
traditional society to the embryonic semi-state structure."' 177
"The rituals vary from Israel-Palestine to Lebanon and Jordan, but the
basic philosophy is based on sulh (settlement), musalaha (reconciliation),
musafaha ('partaking of salt and bread' i.e., hand-shaking), and mumalaha
(breaking bread together)." 178 Arbitration and Sulha, a form of community
mediation, 179 are "the two forms of alternative dispute resolution currently used
174 Ifrah Zilberman, Palestinian Customary Law in the Jerusalem Area, 45 CATH. U. L.
REV. 795, 795 (1996).
175 Id. See e.g., Joseph Ginat, BLOOD DISPUTES AMONG BEDOUIN AND RURAL ARABS IN
ISRAEL (U. of Pittsburgh Press 1987); G. Salahut, THE CUSTOMARY LAW (Acer, Dar al-Aswar.
Arb. 1987); F.H. Stewart, TRIBAL LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD, A Review of Literature, 17
IJMES 474 - 480 (1987); CATHIE J. WIITY, MEDIATION AND SOCIETY: CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT IN LEBANON (1980) (discussing means of conflict resolution in Arab society).
For a useful discussion of conflict resolution in a mature Arab legal system, see John S.
Murray, The Cairo Stories: Some Reflections on Conflict Resolution in Egypt, NEGOTIATIONS
J., Jan. 1997, at 39, 39-60. An insightful summary of arbitration in Egypt's business sector
can be found in: Nathan J. Brown, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD 228-35
(Cambridge, Cambridge U. Press 1997). For an analysis of commercial arbitration in Egypt
from the perspective of the arbitration community, see DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 140,
at 219-49.
176 Zilberman, supra note 174, at 795. See also ELIAS J. JABBOUR, SULHA: PALESTINIAN
PEACEMAKING PROCESS (House of Hope Publications 1996), pp. 53-57.
177 Zilberman, supra note 174, at 796.
178 George E. Irani, Reconciliation and Peace: Rituals for the Middle East, MIDDLE E.
INSIGHT Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 24, 26. ("The three main pillars of the Sulha (from musalaha, or
reconciliation) are: forgiveness (musamaha), shaking hands (musafaha), and partaking of salt
and bread, or sharing a meal (mumalaha). This is essentially a practice remaining from
biblical traditions.")
179 Palestinian Legal Study, Solutions to Contemporary Problems in the Palestinian Civil
and Criminal Systems, Report by the Institute for the Study and Development of Legal
Systems 10 (July 25, 1996) (Sulha is a local form of Palestinian mediation, overseen by the
senior community leader, used to resolve civil disputes). See also JABBOUR, supra note 176;
SAMIR SALEH, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A STUDY IN SHARI'A AND
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by Palestinians outside the [court system]. 1 80 According to Islamic law
(Shari'a), "the purpose of sulh is to end conflict and hostility among believers
so that they may conduct their relationships in peace and aity. 181 The
communal Arab ritual of sulha is "a non-Western indigenous application of the
process of acknowledgment, apology, compensation, forgiveness, and
reconciliation."'
82
B. Dispute Resolution in the Legal System
In sharp contrast, "[i]n the larger Arab cities, individuals involved in
conflicts are more likely... to resort to the official legal system to settle their
disputes.' ' 83 This may be because the existing domestic arbitration scheme is
ill-defined. At the initial hearing, the judge asks the parties if they wish to
arbitrate or mediate. In the West Bank, with the consent of parties, judges may
enquire whether the parties want conciliation. Furthermore, in domestic
arbitration, arbitrators are "required by law to follow all judicial procedures;"
however, arbitrators in WBG generally do not have legal or professional
training.1 84 This lack of legal training often "results in procedural or
substantive legal error" in the arbitration process. I85 Thus, in WBG either a
procedural or substantive error can be the basis for vacating an arbitral process,
effectively resulting in a de novo trial. 186 Arbitration in WBG therefore lacksthe quality of finality and the arbitrators in WBG generally lack the "legal
STATUTE LAW (1984); see generally Palestinian Conflict Resolution Center, Wi'am: Sulha-
Traditional Elements (visited Feb. 4, 2000)<www.planet.edu/-alaslah/
work/sulha/elements.htm> (discussing traditional elements of Sulha); Palestinian Conflict
Resolution Center, Wi'am: Sulha: Yesterday and Today (visited Feb. 4, 2000)
<http:lwww.planet.edu/-alaslahlworklsulhalsulha.htm> (providing an overview of Sulha
yesterday and today).
180 George E. Irani, Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East Conflicts, 5 MERIA. J.
19 (1999).
1. M. Khadduri, Suhl, in C.E. BOswORTH et al., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM, Vol. IX
(Brill, 1997), pp. 845-6.
182 Zilberman, supra note 174, at 796.
183 Irani, supra note 180, at 25. "The legal system is clogged, however, and corruption is
pervasive." Id.
184 Palestinian Legal Study, supra note 179.
185 Id. (stating that both procedure and substantive error can provide "a basis for vacating
an arbitral award and results effectively in a de novo trial, causing even greater delay in the
civil justice process.")
186 Id. In Gaza, "the Court may set aside the award... [w]here an arbitrator or umpire has
misconducted himself or an arbitration award has been improperly procured." DRAYTON,
supra note 50 at Ch. 6, Arbitration, Art. 13 (1933). On the West Bank, "awards may be set
aside... [if] the arbitration of award has been improperly procured .... and ... the
arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings." Id. ARBITRATION, Par.
621 at 329 (Vol. 2).
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sophistication" required in the resolution of international commercial
disputes. 87 Thus, in the WBG, formal arbitration "judgments are [often ]
enforceable only on the basis of honor and social or family pressure."1 8
While it may make a great deal of sense for Palestinian society to follow
customary law or Sulha for local disputes; most international investors require a
more familiar and standard form of arbitration. This is particularly true for
Israeli investors who are demanding access to arbitration in international
transactions. 89  In the spring of 1998, Mandy Barak, director of the
international trade division of the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce,
brought 30 federation members to Gaza to discuss investing in a proposed Gaza
Industrial Estate. The main concern raised by these companies was "how can
you secure our investments?"1 90 The potential investors were concerned about
the lack of Palestinian legislative framework that could secure their
investments. The former director-general of the Israeli Treasury recently
stated that "Israeli businessmen refuse to give up the right to arbitrate...
outside the Israeli legal system," particularly in a developing legal system
where the alternative is not clear. 92 Palestinian judges and attorneys have
recognized the need for modernized alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
to expedite the handling of commercial cases. 193 Only so much, however, can
be done under existing law.
1. The Palestinian Law on the Encouragement of Investment
Recognizing the problems within the existing investment structure, the PA
began reforming Palestinian commercial law to conform the legal structure "to
187 Palestinian Legal Study, supra note 179, at 11.
188 Investing in the PA Areas: Rules for Doing Business, Franchising Opportunities,
MIDDLE E. EXEC. REP., May 1997, at 20, 21.
189 See Patricia Golan, Marketing a Hard Sell Called Gaza Industrial Estate, JERUSALEM
POST, Nov. 30, 1998, at 17.
190 Id.
191 Zilberman, supra note 174, at 796.
192 Golan, supra note 189, at 17 (quoting Ezra Sada, a private economic consultant,
speaking about why he cannot sell the idea of investing in Gaza).
193 Palestine Legal Study, supra note 179, at Status Report 9 (April 15-20, 1996 Meetings,
Gaza, Hebron, Nablus, Ramallah) (members included well-respected judges from Gaza and
the West Bank, leading commercial and civil attorneys, leading criminal defense attorneys,
lead prosecutors in the tradition and security courts of Jenin, and the former Attorney
General of the West Bank).
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more modem standards. 19 4 The unified investment law represents the PA's
first effort.
195
On April 29, 1995, the PA promulgated the Law on the Encouragement of
Investment. The Investment Law created a new legal structure for investment in
the WBG and revoked all prior inconsistent legislation.
96
The World Bank Guidelines on Legal Treatment of Foreign Investment
defines effective investment guarantees as including: "(i) the availability of an
independent and fair forum to settle the dispute between investors and the state,
and (ii) the enforcement of the award rendered.' ' 197 These guidelines
recommend that disputes between foreign investors and the host state be settled
first through negotiations, then national courts, conciliation or binding
arbitration.19
8
2. 1995 Palestinian Investment Law and Dispute Resolution
In contrast to World Bank guidelines, the 1995 Investment Law does not
allow foreign investors any dispute settlement mechanisms other than the
national courts and gives the PNA President (i.e. Yasser Arafat) the right to
194 See MAZEN E. QuPTY, et al., Mazen E. Qupty and Associates, LEGALASPECTS OFDOING
BUSINESS IN PALESTINE 13-14 (1995).
195 Cf. Interim Agreement, art. XVIII, supra note 1,(providing the Council has the power,
within its jurisdiction, to adopt legislation). See also, Investment Law, supra note 4, at app.
603.
196 See Investment Law, supra note 4, at app. 603-10. Article 22 provides that all other
laws "contrary to this Law shall be invalid and revoked." Id. Albeit, the question then raised
is whether the PA or this law are "in the position to revoke all other relevant ...
inconsistent" laws or if this law simply adds to the "multilayered legal environment." FIAS,
supra note 29, at 23.
Article XVII of the Interim Agreement states that "[t]he territorial jurisdiction of the Council
shall encompass Gaza Strip territory, except for the Settlements and Military Installation
Area .... and West Bank territory, except for Area C which.., will be gradually transferred
to Palestinianjurisdiction." Interim Agreement, art. XVII, supra note 1. Because Area"C"
is not yet under Palestinian self-rule, the Investment Law does not apply to this area. Cf id.,
art. XVII, XVIII. See supra Part V for a discussion of pre-existing laws regarding arbitration,
enforcement of foreign awards and investment.
197 FIAS, supra note 29, at 18. See World Bank Development Committee, Guidelines on
the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, reprinted in IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE LEGAL
TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE WORLD BANK GUIDELINES (1993).
198 See James D. Nolan, A Comparative Analysis of the Laotian Law on Foreign
Investment, The World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, and
Normative Rules of International Law on Foreign Direct Investment, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 659, 688 (1998). For a discussion of the benefits of principles imbedded in the
World Bank Guidelines, see Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging
Relational Investment and Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the
Aftermath of the Mexican Financial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 539, 606-11 (1996).
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approve any investor appeals. Article 20 of the 1995 Investment Law:
Settlement of Disputes provides that "It]he Palestinian courts shall have the
competence and jurisdiction to resolve all disputes in accordance with
applicable Palestinian laws."' 99 However, directly after Oslo, the Palestinian
legal system was in a state of "profound deterioration. ' 20° After many
generations of political and military occupation, the Palestinian legal processes
had been "divested of institutional resources, professional expertise, and legal
procedures that are indispensable to the formation of a productive civil
society.' ',2 l The legal system is still in need of significant reform and the
202judiciary is not yet fully developed. This law falls short of the World Bank
definition of effective investment guarantees: this is hardly the required
independent and fair forum where foreign investors can resolve disputes.
Article 19 of the 1995 draft, requires that the President of the PNA
personally decide the appeals of investors who have had their approval denied.This requirement denies investors access to judicial review (and certainly
199 Investment Law, art. 20, supra note 4, at app. 609-10.
200 Palestinian Legal Study, The Restoration and Modernization of the Palestinian Civil
and Criminal Justice Processes, INST. FOR THE STUDY & DEV. OF LEGAL Sys. at 9 (1995)
(reporting the culmination of a collaborative study by Palestinian and U.S. legal opinion
leaders, including judges, lawyers and scholars).
20 Id. at 9.
202 Keith Molkner, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PALESTINIAN LAW ON THE
ENCOURAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT, 2 IPCRI Commercial Law Reports Series at 22 (1995).
See John Quigley, Judicial Autonomy in Palestine: Problems and Prospects, 21 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 697 (1996) (speculating about the prospects of judicial autonomy in an independent
Palestine state); John Quigley, The Role of Law in a Palestinian-Israeli Accommodation, 31
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 351 (1999)(discussing legal norms in Palestine).
203 See Investment Law, art. 19, supra note 4, at app. 609.
Article 19
(1) Should the Agency find an investor, who has been granted a license, has failed to
comply with the provisions of this Law or its regulations, or if an investor fails to abide by
the conditions specified in the investment license, the Agency shall notify the investor in
writing of its intention to cancel or suspend the licensed exemptions in the future or
retrocactively.
(2) Should the Agency find that the license was granted to the investor under false
pretense, deceit, bribery or forgery or in a manner contrary to this Law and its regulations,
the Agency may revoke such a license as of the date of its issue. All taxes, duties and
other benefits and privileges granted to the investment shall be deemed to be payable
immediately, with interest accrued from the date of [sic] the license was issued.
(3) In either of the two above mentioned occurrences, the investor may complain, within
thirty days from the date of notification of the decision to the President of the Authority
whose decision shall be final.
Id. art 19, translated in Fidler, Foreign Investment in Palestine: An Analysis on the Law on
the Encouragement of Investment in Palestine, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 529, at 609.
[Vol. 32:185
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
cannot guarantee a neutral review) as well as precludes the use of binding
international arbitration. As could be expected, many academicians and
practitioners have argued that Articles 20 and 19.3 do not meet international
standards. As example, academicians at the Foreign Investment Advisory
Service ("FIAS"), a joint facility of the International Finance Corporation and
the World Bank, concluded that the dispute settlement mechanism in the 1995
law is flawed because it lacks any judicial review mechanisms and prohibits
"the use of binding international arbitration." 2°4 Others noted that the
Investment Law would be more attractive to foreign investors if it expressly
recognized the option of using international commercial arbitration
mechanisms.0 5
The PA responded to the criticism regarding the 1995 Investment Law,
206
and in May 1998 revised the Investment Law. Article 41 of the 1998 Revised
Investment Law addresses many of the dispute resolution concerns that Article
20 (1995) did not.2°7 In disputes between the "[i]nvestors and the National
Authority that relate to rights and obligations provided for in the Investment
Law"208 "'either party shall have the right to take the dispute to: ... binding,
independent arbitration as provided in the Regulations.' 20 9 However, either
party to a dispute "must request good faith negotiations before it may have
access to... arbitration. ' '210 While this allows the investor more options, and
eliminates the requirement that disputes be tried only in national courts under
Palestinian laws, exactly "what the Regulations will propose is unclear.,
211
There are still questions regarding whether the right to international arbitration
will be an effective right: (i) can the parties choose the law and place of the
arbitration; (ii) will the national courts honor and enforce the arbitration
agreement; or (iii) will the national courts enforce an arbitration award. Each is
an area of great concern to the international investor.
The Revised Investment Law eliminates many of the investment approval
concerns of the 1995 Investment Law. Article 4 (1998) provides that an
204 FIAS, supra note 29, at 18.
205 Molkner, Legal and Structural Hurdles, supra note 1 at 45. Cf. Fidler, supra note 4, at
573 (stating that "[n]o article of the Investment Law mentions, directly or indirectly, the
possibility of arbitration to settle disputes").
206 See Revised Investment Law, supra note 5, at 521. "[T]he Investment Law supercedes
and replaces all prior Laws dealing with Investment in Palestine." Id. art. 46, app. at 535.
207 Compare id. art. 41, app. at 534 and Investment Law, supra note 4, art. 20.
208 Revised Investment Law, supra note 5, art. 40, at 534.
209 Fidler, supra note 5, at 342.
210 Id. art. 41, app. at 521, 534 (providing that once either an Investor or the National
Authority has "request[ed] good faith negotiations," it shall have access to dispute
settlement; and "either party [then] shall have the right to . .. binding, independent
arbitration").
211 Fidler, supra note 5, at 342.
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investor may invest in any sector of the Palestinian economy, except those areas
prohibited by specific law.212 But there are still concerns surrounding an
investor's right to appeal the Agency's decisions to suspend or cancel
213confirmation of exemptions and incentives. The investor has the right to
214appeal as defined in the Regulations. Again, these regulations have not yet
been promulgated.
In an effort to improve the environment for investors the 1998 revisions
provide for a "Palestine Board for Investment Incentive. ' '215 Article 13 (1998)
provides that the Board shall be "an independent judicial person and shall enjoy
full legal jurisdiction to ensure its capacity to achieve and practice all its
activities according to law."216 The Board shall be responsible for encouraging
and facilitating investment in Palestine, presenting investors and investment in
Palestine with guarantees, granting incentives to investors, and creating the
217appropriate atmosphere to encourage investment in Palestine. 17
The Board is managed by a board of directors, consisting of 13 voting
218members. Article 16 provides that the Board's responsibilities shall include
(i) monitoring the implementation of the investment law and submitting
suggested changes to the Council of Ministries and the Palestinian Legislative
212 Revised Investment Law, supra note 5, at 523.
213 See id. arts. 16(17), 33(C), at 527, 532 ("An investor may appeal the Agency's decision
to cancel the Confirmation of Investment [or incentives] under the procedures specified in
the Regulations.").
214 See id. art. 33, at 532.
215 Id. art. 13, at 525.
216 Id.
217 See id. art. 16, app. at 526-27.
238 See id. art. 15, app. at 521,525. The voting members on the board of directors shall be:
the Minster of Economy and Trade (chair); a representative of each of the (a) Ministry of
Finance (deputy), (b) Ministry of Industry, (c) Ministry of Agriculture, (d) Ministry of
Tourism, (e) Ministry of Housing, (f) Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation,
and (g) Monetary Authority; and five representative of the Palestinian private sector to
assume their functions in an independent manner. See id. art. 15.
One commentator has trenchantly pointed out that:
"The board's great dissatisfaction in determining exemption levels combined with the fact
that 13 of the board's 15 members are political appointees, is cause for concern among
potential investors who fear a process that is guided more by politics, favoritism, and
corruption than by sound economics and development considerations. Board posts,
furthermore, are not full-time positions. Thus, appointees can be expected to have private
financial interests that may come into conflict with the board's jurisdiction. The
investment law is also vague in specifying the procedures by which the board members are
dismissed and replaced."
Gil Feiler & Joshua Zaretsky, An Unforeseen Rivalry: The Peace Process and the Jordanian
and Palestinian Economies, in THE ECONOMICS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE: A REASSESSMENT,
supra note, at 150.
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Council;219 (ii) monitoring any Palestinian law or regulation that might limit,
restrict or undermine any rights and guarantees stipulated by the investment
law, and submitting suggested changes of these laws and regulations;220 (iii)
supporting the PA in abiding by any investment agreement that might be signed
with another country or international organization;22' and (iv) considering
updating and developing investment legislation, approving plans and programs
that contribute to the creation of an appropriate atmosphere for investment.222
While the 1998 Law provides a vehicle for the Board to submit suggestions for
an international commercial arbitration law, there is nothing that requires it to
do so. The Board can only be as effective as the suggestions it makes and the
reception these suggestions receive, for the Board has no power to enforce
these suggestions. If action is taken, it is the decision of the Council of
Ministries and the Palestinian Legislative Council.
Although the changes are an improvement, the investment laws are still
vague and open to excessive discretion. One commentator states that the
Revised Investment Law is "disappointing when compared to international
standards and practices in protecting foreign investment."223 If the Palestinian
Council wants to follow international practice and include arbitration as a
dispute settlement mechanism, it must do so expressly and transparently.
224
Where foreign investment is desired-transparency of the legal structure and
applicable laws is required and, at a minimum, these laws should meet
international standards.
VII. REGIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION CONVENTIONS IN ARAB
STATES
There are two main regional Arbitration Conventions among Arab States:
the Riyadh Convention on Judicial Cooperation, 25 and the Amman Arab
Convention on Commercial Arbitration.
219 See Revised Investment Law, supra note 5, art. 16(10).
220 See id. art. 16(11).
221 See id. art. 16(12), at 526.
222 See id. art. 16(15), at 527.
223 Fidler, supra note 5, at 343.
224 Id.
225 Riyadh Arab Convention on Judicial Cooperation, Apr. 6, 1983 [hereinafter Riyadh
Convention], reprinted in INT'L HANDBOOK ON COMM. ARB., annex 1-1-4 (Kluwer L. Int'l)
(Jan. 1990). The member states of the Arab League include: "Jordan, United Arab Emirates,
Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Djibuti, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Somalia,
Iraq, the Sultanate of Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North
Yemen, Mauritania and South Yemen." Abdul Hamid E1-Ahdab, General Introduction on
Arbitration in Arab Countries, in INT'L HANDBOOK ON COMM. ARB. 1, 17 n.47 (Kluwer L.
Int'l) (Dec. 1998).
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The Riyadh Convention is a regional multilateral convention between
Arab States and thus applies only to foreign awards made in other member
227Arab States. When an award is referred to a court for enforcement, the court
cannot examine the substance of the dispute; it can only enforce or refuse to
228
enforce the award. The Riyadh Convention is a step forward for those
countries that have not signed the New York Convention. Palestine is party to
229this Convention.
The Amman Convention is also signed only by Arab States and, once
230again, Palestine is a signatory. It provides that the high court of each member• 23
country has jurisdiction to grant enforcement of arbitral awards. The Amman
Convention created the Arab Centre for Commercial Arbitration ("Centre"),
headquartered in Rabat, Morocco, for the settlement of disputes between Arab
232entities. Awards made by the Centre are executory and must be enforced by
the high court of each member state; however, the high court can refuse to
enforce the award if it is against public order.233 The Amman Convention does
not allow for judicial appeal of awards made by the Centre, such awards can
only be set aside by the centre.234 In reality, the Amman Convention has not yet
226 Amman Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration, April 14, 1987 [hereinafter
Amman Convention], reprinted in INT'L HANDBOOK ON COMM. ARB. Annex II- I (Kluwer L.
Int'l) (Jan. 1990); and Mahir Jaili, Amman Arab Convention on CommercialArbitration, 7 J.
INT'L ARB. 139, annex at 146 (1990). The Amman Convention was signed by fourteen states
on April 14, 1987. See id.
For a thorough examination of commercial arbitration in the Middle East, see generally EL-
AHDAB, supra note 55; El-Ahdab, General Introduction on Arbitration in Arab Countries,
supra note 225, at 1.
227 EI-Ahdab, supra note 123, at 331. "The Riyadh Convention affirms the executory
character of arbitral awards made in a member state without taking into account the
nationality of the winning party." Id.
228 See id. The court can only refuse in certain defined cases. See id. at 332-33. Under the
Riyadh Convention a court can "refuse enforcement of an award if it contains provisions
contrary to the principles of the shari'a, even if the current notion of public order in the
enforcing country would allow such a provision." Id. at 333.
229 See Jaili, supra note 226, at 139.
230 See id.
231 See Amman Convention, supra note 226, art. 35, reprinted in INT'L HANDBOOK ON
COMM ARB. Annex HI-7 (Kluwer L. Int'l) (Jan. 1990), and Jaili, supra note 233, annex at
152 (1990); see also id., at 144.
232 See Amman Convention, supra note 226, arts. 4, 12, reprinted in INT'LHANDBOOKON
COMM ARB. Annex 11-2-3 (Kluwer L. Int'l) (Jan. 1990), and Jaili, supra note 226, at 147-48.
233 See Amman Convention, supra note 226, art. 35; see also Jaili, supra note 226, at 144.
The meaning of the term "public order" may differ in each member state; and the Amman
Convention does not indicate whether international awards must comply with national public
order or international public order. Id. at 334.
234 See Amman Convention, supra note 226, art. 27; and Jaili, supra note 226, at 150.
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become operative and the Centre thereby has not yet been established. To date,
no commercial dispute has been settled or even referred to arbitration under the
Amman Convention:
Concerning the enforcement of arbitral awards, the Arab countries can be
classified into three categories:
235
1. Arab countries which have not acceded to the New York Convention
include Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Libya, The United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and
Sudan.236 "[T]hese countries do not distinguish between national and
international arbitration.
' '237
2. Arab countries that have acceded to the New York Convention include
Jordan, Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, Kuwait, Egypt, Morocco and Saudi
Arabia.2 8
3. Arab countries which have passed International Arbitration acts and
whose laws distinguish between domestic and international arbitration and
thereby "went farther" than the New York Convention include Lebanon,
Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt.239
Because it is not recognized as a state, Palestine cannot, at present, accede
to the New York Convention.24° However, it is signatory to both Arab
arbitration conventions.241 Clearly there are a number of Arab states that have
modem, sophisticated international arbitration acts.242 Palestine's inability to
accede to the New York Convention, does not prevent it from joining this
235 See EI-Ahdab, supra note 128, at 169.
236 See id. at 170. For a discussion of each country's laws, including when the national
laws provide that the courts can set aside arbitration awards, see generally id. at 170-74. It
has also been noted that the "reception policy" is paramount. Id. at 180. It provides that in
Arab countries, which have not acceded to the New York Convention, an award may be
enforced in another Arab country which acceded to the Convention. See id. at 180-8 1.
237 See id. at 170.
238 See id. at 174.
239 See id. at 175. These countries include Lebanon, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt. Each of
these countries has passed an International Arbitration Act: Lebanon - Decree-law no. 90
dated 16 September 1983; Algeria - Legislative decree no. 83.09 dated 25 April 1993;
Tunisia - Law no. 93.42 dated 26 April 1993; Egypt - Law issued on 15 April 1994 and
effective as a of 15 May 1994. Both Algeria and Lebanon were strongly influenced by
French law, while Tunisia and Egypt were strongly influenced by the UNCITRAL Model
Law. Id.
240 See discussion infra pp. 224-28.
241 Id.
242 We should not forget that much Middle Eastern opposition to international arbitration
tends to be "articulated increasingly in terms of a demand for incorporating the Islamic legal
tradition in the international practice of arbitration; the claims stand in stark contrast to the
earlier critiques of arbitration itself as a distributively biased mechanism of dispute
settlement." Shalakany, supra note 32, at 419.
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category of Arab states which have passed international arbitration acts and
whose laws are more advanced than the New York Convention. "[Iln countries
which have adopted the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, enforcement of foreign
awards may be achieved on exactly the same bases as under the [New York]
Convention without any need to refer to it."
243
VIII. WHAT IS THE LEGAL PERSONALITY OF PALESTINE?
As we can readily see, the ability of Palestine to enter into arbitration
agreements or treaties depends on the question of whether Palestine can validly
sign agreements with other countries? This question forces us to review the
legal status of the PA as an entity under international law.
International law generally provides that for an entity to be considered as a
state it must meet four requirements: (i) "a permanent population;" (ii) "a
defined territory;" (iii) an authority exercising governmental functions, and (iv)
a capacity to conduct foreign relations.244 There is considerable academic
debate as to whether Palestine meets the international requirements of
statehood.245 Both the PLO and the PA have accrued some indicia of statehood.
The PA has 86 diplomatic missions abroad246 and over 20 countries have
representative offices to the PA.247 Under the Oslo process, the PA provides
243 Paulsson, supra note 102, at 20 (noting that the passage of time has seen enforcement
of foreign awards through mechanisms other than the New York Convention, including the
passage of international commercial arbitration acts).
244 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art 1, 49 Stat. 3097,
3100,165 L.N.T.S. 19, 25. For our purposes the relevant issue is whether Palestine can
validly sign agreements with other countries, and moreover, what can these agreements
concern. This depends, of course, on the legal status of the PA as well as the powers, if any,
afforded the WBG under OSLO implementation agreements.
245 See, e.g., Frank L.M. Van De Craen, The Territorial Title of the State of Israel to
"Palestine": An Appraisal in International Law, 14 REVUE BELGE DE DROITINT'L 500,532
(1978) (discussing Palestine's "rights to sovereignty and Independence"); Richard Wilner,
Nationalist Movements and the Middle East Peace Process: Exercises in Self-Determination,
I U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 297, 326 n. 124 (1995) (arguing that "Palestine currently
possesses the necessary elements required for recognition as a state in international law");
Francis A. Boyle, Correspondence, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 879, 880-81 (1990) (arguing that
Palestine meets the requirements for statehood). But see note 253 infra for arguments that
Palestine in not a state). See generally Danjani, supra note 35; John Quigley, Palestine's
Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination and the Palestinians, 65 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 31 (1971).
246 See Palestinian National Authority Official Website, Foreign Affairs, Embassies,
Missions, General and Special Delegations of Palestine Abroad (visited Feb. 10, 2000)
<http://www.pna.net/faffairs/embassies.htm>.
247 See Palestinian National Authority Official Website, Foreign Affairs, The
Representative Offices to the Palestinian Authority (PA) (visited Feb. 10, 2000)
http://www.pna.net/faffairs/diplomatic-corpse.htm [hereinafter Representative Offices to the
PA].
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(under certain Israeli restrictions) passports and postage stamps; over 79
countries have acknowledged the Palestinian passport.248 Together the PLO and
the PA do have a permanent population, a defined territory (as defined in
various peace agreements), a governmental body, and the ability to enter into
relations with other states, at least in areas of economic development.249 "In
November 1998, the PA opened an airport in the Gaza Strip, an act many saw
as a "potent symbol of statehood and development for the Palestinian
people."
, 50
Notwithstanding the above, the PA "lacks direct authority over the
population and territory of Palestine."251 While it "directly governs segments of
the [Palestinian Territories], its authority is subordinated to Israel's and it is
prohibited by the [the Declaration of Principles] and subsequent agreements
from independently participating in international affairs. 252 The traditionally
accepted view of international lawyers is that Palestine is not yet a state.
253
Even international commercial agreements to which other Arab states can be
signatories refuse to accept membership of the PA at this time. 5 4 The
'managers' of most international conventions or institutions believe that the
248 Palestinian National Authority Official Website, Foreign Affairs, Countries Who Have
Already Acknowledged the Palestinian Passport (last modified Mar. 13, 1999)
<http://www.pna.netlfaffairs/pal-passport-recognize.htm>. See generally Danjani, supra
note 35, at 60-69 (discussing Palestinian Interim Self-Government authority). Indeed,
Palestine will soon receive its own suffix or domain on the web. See Jeri Clausing, Web
Domain to Be Assigned for Palestinian Territory, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999, at C10.
249 See Danjani, supra note 35, at 78-79 ("[T]he PLO and the PA fulfill aspects of the
objective criteria for statehood at least as well as some recognized States.").
250 Stephen 1. Glain, Palestinian Opening of Airport Symbolizes Emerging State Jobs,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1998, at A19.
251 See Danjani, supra note 35 at 79.
252 Id. at 79-80.
253 See generally, e.g., James L. Prince, The International Legal Implications of the
November 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Statehood, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 681 (1989)
(reviewing in part the "objective requirements for statehood" relative to Palestine). For a
discussion of the issue, see generally John Quigley, Sovereignty in Jerusalem, 45 Cath. U. L.
Rev. 765 (1996); Kathryn M. McKinney, The Legal Effects of the Israeli-PLO Declaration
of Principles: Steps Toward Statehood for Palestine, 18 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 93 (1994)
(arguing that Palestine falls short of statehood during the interim period, but that statehood
"will be established after the interim period"). See also, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 206 (1987).
254 See, e.g. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Oct.
11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter MIGA Convention] Member states in the middle east
include Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Lybyan Arab Jamahiriya, Oman, Pakistan, Egypt,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, but not Palestine. See id. at 1634..
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West Bank and Gaza, at this time, "do not, together, form a unit independent
and unified enough to constitute a State."25
It should not be forgotten that the various PLO declarations of its intention
to create a "provisional Government of the State of Palestine" never resulted in
international recognition of the PLO as a sovereign government, "but only as
the (sole legitimate) 'representative of the Palestinian people.' '2 5 6 As an
example in November 1988, the PLO declared the establishment of the state of
Palestine.257 However, the follow-up U.N. vote in which "104 members
'recognized the declaration of the State of Palestine, ' 258 is best understood as a
"gesture of solidarity" rather than recognition in the traditional sense.259 The
plain fact is that "[r]ecognition statements alone are seldom a safe guide to the
intention of the recognizing State., 260 For as Ian Brownlie points out, the
question of recognition depends in part on "the intention of the government
using it."
261
The same is true with other gestures as, for example, the 1974 U.N. vote
inviting Palestine to serve as a permanent observer.22 Or for the July 1998
U.N. vote upgrading Palestine's status and granting it the right to participate in
255 Danjani, supra note 35, at 79.
256 Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law, with particular
reference to Governments in Exile, 17 (Oxford 1998).
257 Palestine National Council's Declaration of Independence, in U.N. Doc. A/43/827-
S/20278, Ann. III, at 15 (1988), 27 ILM 1668 (1988) (the Palestine National Council
declared the "establishment of the State of Palestine"). For an analysis of the legal aspects of
the Declaration, see MUSA E. MAZZAWI, PALESTINE AND THE LAW: GUIDELINES FOR THE
RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT 272-74 (1997).
258 YEZID SAYIGH, ARMED STRUGGLE AND THE SEARCH FOR A STATE: THE PALESTINIAN
NATIONAL MOVEMENT 1949-1993 624(1997). Even before this declaration the PLO had
entered into agreements with Lebanon and Jordan on the dispensation of Palestinian refugee
aid in those host countries. See Feuer, Les accords passis par les Gouvernements Jordanien
et Libanais avec les organisations palestiniennes, 16 ANN. FRANCAIS DE DROIT INT'L 177
(1970).
259 See Talmon, supra note 256, at 42 & n.105. Note that "[m]ost states that have
recognized the 'state of Palestine' . .. have elevated the PLO office in their country to the
status of embassy." Id. at 158, n.236 Most states have done little else to implement that
'recognition.'
260 Id. at 42.
261 Ian Brownlie, Recognition in Theory and Practice, 53 B.Y.B.I.L. 197, 199 (1982).
262 G.A. Res. 3237, 29 U.N. GAOR. Supp. (No. 31) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
Permanent observers have a permanent invitation to observe the U.N. General Assembly
sessions, they can speak when recognize, but cannot vote. Guidelines for Implementation of
General Assembly Resolutions Granting Observer Status on a Regular Basis to Certain
Regional Intergovernmental Organizations, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
National Liberation Movements in Africa, 1975 U.N. JURID. Y.B. 164, 167, U.N. Doc.
ST/Leg/SER.C/13.
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General Assembly's general debate, including the right to co-sponsor draft
resolutions and decisions on Palestine and Middle East issues.263
When it comes to substance not gesture, as a practical matter most
international organizations, including the United Nations, fall on the side of
caution and have not allowed Palestine to join as a member state.2 4 However,
several Arab regional organizations and Islamic organizations have given the
PLO the status and privileges of a member state. These include the League of
Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Arab Monetary
Fund, the Council of Arab Economic Unity, and the Islamic Development
Bank.2 65 Further the PA 266 has signed numerous bilateral and a number of
267
multilateral treaties.
We recognize that the 1994 Declaration of Principles assumed that
negotiations would yield a permanent, or "final status" settlement by May
1999.261 That date has come and gone. While the status of the Oslo accords
after May 4 remain open to dispute,269 the PA has claimed that it will declare a
Palestinian state 'not later than' September 13, 2000.270 Whether they will do
so and whether such a declaration will be "recognized" by other states remains
to be seen.
263 Israel Downplays U.N. Decision to Upgrade Status of Palestinians, JEWISH
TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY, July 7, 1998.
264 See G.A. Res., 3237, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
Whether Palestine is a state also raises the issue of sovereign immunity and the Act of State
doctrine. The Act of State doctrine traditionally precludes courts in the United States from
inquiring into the validity of the public acts of a recognized foreign sovereign power
committed within its own territory. See De Vries, supra note 255; Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabatino 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964). Because Palestine is not a sovereign state, it is
presumably not protected by the Act of State doctrine or sovereign immunity. See Boyle,
supra note 245.
265 See generally, Yearbook of International Organizations (33d ed. 1996).
266 Or the PLO on behalf of the PA.
267 See discussion supra Part VI.
268 Declaration of Principles, supra note 1, at 1528-29.
269 The legal issue if whether the Oslo Accords terminated on May 4 has been mooted by
subsequent agreements at Wye and Cairo. The "pure" question, however, of May 4, 1999, is
discussed in HERBERT HANSELL & NICHOLAS ROSTOW, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OFMAY 4, 1999
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1999).
270 The September Deadline, THE JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 6, 2000, at 9; see also Israeli
Prime Minister's Office Comments on Palestine's State Declaration, BBC World Broadcasts,
Mar. 7, 2000 (Yasser Arafat declared that he intends "to declare a [Palestine] an independent
state on September 13th.' ') September 13, 2000 is the seventh anniversary of "the historic
Rabin-Arafat handshake on the White House lawn." Id.
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Accepting that the WBG is neither a state, "nor a constitutive unit of a
federal state," its "legal personality... is not clearly identifiable or defined. 27'
Thus, Palestine holds a rather unique place in international legal discourse. Its
legal personality differs in part whether looked at from the perspective of the
Third World (which has all but embraced it)272 or the developed world,
273particularly the United States (which has kept its distance). While likely not
yet a 'state',274 it still has a legal personality that cannot be ignored.
IX. WHAT CAN THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY Do TO RESPOND To
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S REQUEST FOR CERTAINTY As To
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES?
If the PA is going to attract the foreign investment it requires, it is
imperative that it create a legal environment that is receptive to foreign
275investors. Central to this environment is a dispute resolution law that governs
international commercial transactions. The PA can enact its own legislation to
create a clear international commercial arbitration law, which provides the
required access to commercial dispute settlement mechanisms, including the
276recognition and enforcement of foreign awards. When drafting such a law
the PA should look to the international models available, specifically the
UNCITRAL Model Law, the experience of its neighbors (including Egypt,
Jordan and Israel), and the parties with whom the PA would like to enter into
agreements.
When attempting to modernize their international commercial arbitration
laws and attract foreign investment, many states have looked to the
271 Mala Tabory, The Legal Personality of the Palestinian Autonomy, in NEw POLITICAL
AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 139 (Amos Shapiro & Mala Tabory eds., 1999).
272 See, discussion supra pp. 224-26.
273 On September 27, 2000, the House voted 385-27 in the HR 5272, middle East Peace
Through Negotiations Act, 2 nd Sess. 10 61h Cong. Sept. 25, 2000, to cut off all but
humanitarian aid to Palestine should there be a unilateral declaration of statehood.
274 See discussion infra p 235..
275 See generally, supra notes 32, 33, 377 (noting that if countries want to attract foreign
capital, they must give assurances to foreign private investors regarding the safety of their
investments, and that access to international commercial arbitration is critical to foreign
investment incentives).
276 See e.g., Sultanate Decree No. 47/97 issuing the Act on Arbitration in Civil and
commercial Matters, Official Gazette No. 602 (1997) (Oman), translated in WORLDTRADE&
ARB. MATTERS, Jan. 1998, at 173 (providing an example of domestic legislation, which
recognizes the importance of international arbitration in settlement of disputes). This new
Omani Arbitration Act resembles the Egyptian Act on arbitration issued in 1994. See Abdul
Hamid El-Ahdab, The New Omani Arbitration Act in Civil and Commercial Matters, J. INT'L
ARB., Dec. 1997, at 59, 60. The Egyptian Act is modeled on the UNCITRAL Model Law.
See id. See also Abdelrahman Mohammed Elnafie, Oman Reforms Its Judicial System: New
Commercial Court Law, 20 MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE Rep. 3, 8 (1997).
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UNCITRAL Model Law.277 The Model Law was created as a "legal regime
geared to international commercial arbitration, without affecting any relevant
treaty in force in the State adopting the Model Law."278 It "is easily
recognizable, meets the specific needs of international commercial arbitration,
and provides an international standard with solutions acceptable to parties from
different States and legal systems. 279
In adopting the Model Law, Germany commented that "the user
friendliness and the arbitration friendliness of a law is ensured when the
drafters do not omit any important provisions from the text of the Model Law
and do not add too many provisions [thus] preserv[ing] the original spirit and
regulatory framework of the Law.' 280 Indeed, the Secretary of UNCITRAL, Mr.
Gerold Herrman, recently noted that in countries that have adopted the Model
Law deviations are rare, but where deviations have occurred real problems were
encountered. 281 Indeed, Egypt recently discovered that the majority of
difficulties in the new arbitration law are where they deviated from the Model
Law.
282
While some modifications are necessary, it is important to retain the
transparency of the law. The Scottish Advisory committee put it aptly when it
stated that:
[t]he main object of the Model Law is to provide a framework for arbitration
which is readily understandable by people of very different legal cultures.
Accordingly, the Committee recommends that any legislation to give effect
277 See e.g. Klaus Peter Berger, the Implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law in
Germany, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., Jan. 1998, 38-39; Park, supra note 116; Tracey S.
Work, India Satisfies Its Jones for Arbitration: New Arbitration Law in India, 10
TRANSNAT'L LAw. 217, 218, 239 (1997) (explaining that both India and the Province of
Ontario are modeled after the UNCITRAL Model Law); Robert Morgan, The English
Arbitration Act 1996 and Reform ofArbitration Law in Hong Kong and Singapore: A Brave
New World?, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP., Dec. 1996, at 20, 20 (1996); Peter W.G. Carey,
International Commercial Arbitration in Ontario: A Judicial Shift of Perspective, MEALEY'S
INT'L ARE. REP., Sept. 1996, at 31, 31; Dr. M.I.M. Aboul-Enein, Reflection on the New
Egyptian Law on Arbitration, 11 ARBITRATION INT'L 75 (1995); Sami Kallel, The Tunisian
Law on International Arbitration, 4 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 233, 235 (1993); Dahmane Ben
Abderrahman, New Algerian Legislation on International Arbitration, MID. E. EXEc. R.,
Dec. 1993, at 9, 9 (discussing the fact that the Algerian legislation considered the
UNCITRAL Model Law).
278 Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law International
Commercial Arbitration (visited Feb. 9, 2000) <http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/ar-
bconc/ml-arb.htm> [hereinafter Explanatory Note].
279 See id.
280 See Berger, supra note 277, at 38-39.
281 See Herrman, supra note 116.
282 See id., at 212-13. For a description of the Egyptian Act and how it diverges from the
UNCITRAL Model Law, see EL-AEDAB, supra note 55, at 155-202.
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to its proposals should depart from the language of the Model Law only
where essential. This is the course of action which has been taken in those
283
countries which have already adopted the Model Law.
The Canadian Court of Appeals has also strongly endorsed the Model
Law's principles of international commercial arbitration. It recently stated
"predictability in the enforcement of dispute resolution provisions is an
indispensable precondition to any international business transaction and
facilitates and encourages the pursuit of freer trade on an international scale."
284
Germany found an added advantage in drafting the wording of the new
arbitration act as closely as possible to the Model Law-"the translation of the
law could use the original wording of the official English" text, allowing
foreign practitioners to quickly identify that "the new German law is in line
with the original text of the Model Law. 285
While the Revised Palestinian Investment Law provides that the Board can
submit suggestions for an international commercial arbitration law; 286 there is
no need to wait for a Board to make suggestions, which will then be modified
in the hurley-burley of the Palestinian legislative process. Instead the PA should
take a forthright position and adopt its own separate international commercial
arbitration act, such as the draft suggested in this article.
By adopting a new international commercial arbitration act as domestic
legislation now, when Palestine becomes a sovereign state it will already have
the domestic legislation needed to sign and ratify the relevant international
arbitration conventions, namely the New York and ICSID Conventions.
Ratification of these treaties will not conflict with the inter-Arab arbitration
287agreements. In short, the PA national commercial arbitration laws willalready be in conformity with international standards.
X. HOW A PALESTINIAN ARBITRATION LAW FITS INTO THE INTERIM
AGREEMENT
Under the Interim Agreement, the Palestinian National Council ("PNC")
. .. . . 288
has the power to adopt legislation in the areas within its jurisdiction. Within
the PNC's jurisdiction is the power to (i) "formulate and conduct Palestinian
policies and supervise their implementation;" (ii) "issue any rule or regulation
under powers given in approved legislation and administrative decisions
necessary for the realization of Palestinian self-government;" (iii) "employ
283 Lord Dervaird, Scotland and the UNCITRAL Model Law: The Report to the Lord
Advocate of the Scottish Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 6 ARB. INT'L 63, 67
(1990).
284 Automatic Systems Inc. v. Bracknell Corp., 18 O.R.(3d) 257, 264 (C.A. 1994).
285 Berger, supra note 277, at 43.
286 See Revised Investment Law, art. 16, supra note 5, at app. 521, 526.
287 See discussion infra Part X.
288 Interim Agreement, art. XVIII(2), supra note 1.
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staff, sue and be sued and conclude contracts;" and (iv) "keep and administer
registers and records. 289 The PNC's jurisdiction explicitly does not include the
sphere of foreign relations, including the "establishment abroad . . . of
embassies, consulates or other types of foreign missions.,,290 Notwithstanding
these limitations,291 "the PLO may conduct negotiations and sign agreements
with states or international organizations for the benefit of the Council in four
defined areas:
(1) economic relations as "specifically defined" in Annex V of the Interim
Agreement;
(2) agreements with donor countries implementing arrangements for assisting
the PA;
(3) agreements implementing regional development plans or agreements
entered into in the framework of the multilateral talks; and
(4) cultural, scientific and educational agreements. 292
Annex V, the Protocol for Economic Relations, provides for Israeli and
Palestinian recognition of each other's economic ties with other markets and
the need to create a better economic environment. 293
289 Interim Agreement, art. IX(2), supra note 1.
290 Interim Agreement, Annex V, preamble, supra note 2.
The expression "foreign relations," as defined under Article VI, paragraph 2.a., includes
the establishment abroad, or in the Gaza Strip or Jericho area, of embassies, consulates or
other types of foreign missions and posts, the appointment or admission of diplomatic and
consular staff, and the exercise of diplomatic functions. However, certain dealings between
the Authority and representatives of foreign states and international organizations, and the
establishment in the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area of representative offices, other than those
above-mentioned, are not deemed to constitute activities falling under the definition of
foreign relations, provided such activities are for the purpose of implementing the economic
agreements.
Under the Agreement, the PLO is the organization authorized to conduct negotiations and
sign agreements with states or international organizations for the benefit of the PA. Such
authorization, however, is limited to the following cases: economic agreements, agreements
with donor countries for purposes of implementing arrangements of the provision of
assistance to the PA, agreements to implement the regional development plans detailed in
Annex IV of the Declaration and cultural, scientific and educational agreements. Emphasis
added.
Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Legal Aspects of the World Bank's Assistance to The West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, VII THE PALESTINLAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Al-Shaybani
Society of International Law 1992/944), reprinted in Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank
in a Changing World 355, 369 (1995). For the standard Israeli discussion, see, e.g., Joel
Singer, Aspects of Foreign Relations Under the Israel-Palestinian Agreements on Interim
Self-GovernmentArrangements for the West Bank and Gaza, 28 ISRAEL L. REV. 268 (1994).
291 Interim Agreement, art. IX, supra note 1.
292 Id.
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Annex V defines "economic" to include: import taxes and import policy,
monetary and financial issues, direct and indirect taxes, labor, agriculture,
industry, and tourism, insurance.294 Specifically, under the sphere of industry,
Palestine has the right "to employ various methods in encouraging and
promoting the development of the Palestinian industry," including those
"methods of encouraging industry resorted to in Israel." 95 Both Israel and
Palestine shall exchange information about the methods employed by them in
296the encouragement of their respective industries. Most recently, in the Wye
River Memorandum, Israel and the PLO committed "to... promote economic
development in [WBG]. '297
A. An Argument that PA Arbitration Agreements Do Not Violate the
Paris Protocols
Israel's strategic purpose in placing constraints on PA treaty behavior is
clearly to "disallow the PA from participating in the international process in
any way that could influence its international status. ' 2 98 There is no necessary
reason, however, why a Palestinian arbitration agreement should do so. Given
sufficient goodwill, it should prove possible to craft a PA arbitration agreement
that would accommodate Israeli fears that such an agreement provides support
for PA statehood claims. Indeed bilateral arbitration agreements could be
specifically classified as economic agreements, which are already allowed
under Oslo.299 Surely, Palestinian "BITs" can fit within that rubric (and such
293 Interim Agreement, Annex V Protocol on Economic Relations, Preamble, supra note 2.
Singer argues that:
"[t]he four spheres in which, as an exception to the general rule, the PLO is permitted to
enter into agreements for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority are clearly specified.
Thus, sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph VI(2)(b) does not provide a blanket permission
covering all economic agreements, but rather is limited to those economic agreements
"specifically provided by Annex IV," i.e. in the Protocol Concerning Economic
Relations."
Singer, supra note 290, at 286-87.
294 Interim Agreement, supra note 1, arts. I - XI.
295 Id. art. IX (2). Israel, for example, has entered into a Free Trade Agreement with the
United States, establishing a free trade area which removes trade barriers; and, in 1975,
established a bilateral free trade area with the European Community. See Avraham Azrieli,
Improving Arbitration Under the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement: A Framevork for a
Middle-East Free Trade Zone, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 187, 191-99 (discussing the Free Trade
Agreement).
296 Interim Agreement, supra note 1, art. IX (b).
297 Wye River Memorandum, Oct. 23, 1998, Isr.-PLO, art. III, para. 1, 37 I.L.M. 1251.
298 See Danjani, supra note 35, at 68.
299 See discussion supra Part II.
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BITs can contain arbitration clauses).,00 Other agreements like the Jordanian-
Palestinian General Agreement for Cooperating and Coordination can be styled
as an economic agreement30' as can innumerable "state to state" agreements
covering both the "core" and the "periphery" of economic activity.302
Second, even if an arbitration treaty is deemed to be "foreign relations", if
the legal relations between the PA and Israel called for in Oslo continue to
"warm up,"303 Israel may well be prepared to acquiesce in the Palestinians
signing arbitration agreements with third parties - or willing multilateral parties
- in that a functioning PA arbitration regime is good for both countries. This
notion of acquiescence is bolstered by treaty law. Article 45 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a state (in this case, Israel)
cannot suspend or terminate a treaty (in this case the Interim Agreement) if,
"after becoming aware of the facts," Israel either (a) expressly agrees that the
Agreement remains in force, or (b) Israel "must by reason of its conduct be
considered as having acquiesced in the validity of the treaty or in its
maintenance in force or in operation, as the case may be."3°4 In other words,
Israel can expressly waive the relevant limitations of the Interim Agreement, or
it can impliedly acquiesce in specific PA deviations from those limitations.
While the Israeli 'acquiescence' is irrevocable it is limited to the specific area
of acquiescence, such as arbitration treaties, and would not extend to other
areas of non-economic activity.
In a situation where neither Israel nor the PLO oppose a treaty "for the
benefit of the Palestinian Authority" 3°5 (like the PLO-Jordan treaty) such a
treaty might well be considered "as subsequent State practice within the
meaning of international treaty law. As such, this might eventually lead to
extending the powers of the Council beyond dealings referred to in Article 6,
paragraph 2(c) of the Cairo agreement" (now art. 9, para, 5(c) of the Interim
300 See discussion infra pp. 234-36
301 For text see, 24 J. PALESTINE STUD. (0. 3) 138 (1995).
302 See Sanford R. Silverberg, Diplomatic Recognition of States In Statu Nascendi: The
Case of Palestine, 6 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'LL 21, 40-46 (1998) (providing a partial list of
such state-to-state agreements).
303 Toga Tzimuki, Legal Cooperation Between Israel and PA Tightened, YEDIOTH
AHRONOTH (Oct. 7, 1999)
304 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 45, 8 I.L.M. 679, 697 (1969). As
discussed later in this paper, Israel already has functionally "acquiesced" to the EU - PLO
trade Agreement. See discussion infra pp. 236-40. For what it is worth, note also that Great
Britain in 1944 acquiesced to Palestine signing a postal agreement with the U.S. See Parcel
Post Agreement, May 10, 1943 & Sept. 8, 1944 EAS 439, 10 Barons 651, 58 stat. 1522.
305 Thilo Marauhn, Financing Autonomy Through Financial Autonomy? Fiscal and
Monetary Aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian Agreements From a Public International Law
Perspective, in NEW POLITICAL ENTITIES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 1,
311 (Amos Shapira & Mala Tabory eds., 1999).
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Agreement). 306 And indeed, there is evidence that the PA has engaged in
sufficient international contacts that the subsequent state practice doctrine
might allow the PA a wider ambit of diplomatic activity in the international
arena (although not statehood). As but one example, states like Morocco have
credentialed representatives to the PA in Gaza3°T and entities like the Vatican
recently concluded an agreement on religious freedom with the PA."' Note
also that the official Palestinian representative in Egypt is designated as a PNA
official. 30 9 "The PLO representative in Moscow signed a protocol on security
cooperation with Russia in the name of the PNA. Also, the PNA joined the
International Airport Council as the PNA, all in violation of Article
[6](2)(b).,, 31° But there is no reason for scholars and international lawyers to go
that far.
Indeed, other than an excess of caution, drawn largely from concern over
domestic political fallout, there is no necessary reason why treaty making is a
dispositive indicia of statehood. While the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties explicitly states that "every state possesses capacity to conclude
treaties," 311 it leaves open the door for treaty-signing by non-state entities.
Indeed, the Convention states further that "[t]he fact that the present
Convention does not apply to international agreements concluded between
States and other subjects of international law or between such other subjects of
international law.., shall not affect (a) the legal force of such agreements., 312
Thus, even if the PA is not a state in terms of the Vienna Convention, it is hard
to argue that the PA is not a 'subject of international law.' And as Geoffrey
Watson has recently made clear, "there appears to be ample precedent for the
proposition that a national liberation movement ... [like the PA]... has the
capacity to enter into binding international agreements with states."31 3
306 Id.
307 See Representative Offices to the PA, supra note 247.
308 See Sarah Delaney, Vatican, PLO Strengthen Ties, WASH. Post, Feb. 16,2000, at A17.
"The Vatican and the [PLO] agreed.., to open holy sites and strengthen and clarify their
relations.... The two sides signed a document recognizing the PLO as the representative for
[the PA]." Id. "[Tihe Vatican signed an agreement today with the Palestine Liberation
Organization that would protect freedom of religion and the legal status of Christian
churches." Alessandra Stanley, Vatican and P.L.O. Sign Pact Guaranteeing the Church's
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2000, at A7.
309 This is formally a violation of article 6(2)(a) of the Peace Treaty.
310 Silverberg, supra note 302, at 39.
311 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 6, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332,
334.
312 Id. art. 3(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 333 (emphasis added). Early drafts of the Convention
explicitly stated that non-states can enter into treaty obligations. The matter is fully reviewed
in Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law, 47-48 (Kluwer 1996).
313 GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO AccORDs 58, 91-102 (Oxford, 2000).
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We propose that the PA raise with Israel the possibility of Israeli
acquiescence to PA arbitration treaties with the understanding that such
acquiescence is for a specific purpose and neither reflects an enlarged Israeli
view toward general PA authority in this area nor provides support for the PA
claims to statehood.
B. Existing Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements of the PA that Include
Arbitration Provisions
Under the Interim Agreement, the PLO can enter into economic and trade
agreements for the benefit of the PA. The PLO is currently party to several
agreements, which contain arbitration clauses. These agreements currently state
that either party, including the PLO, will implement the decision of the
arbitrator. It is not clear exactly how these agreements relate to current
arbitration laws operative within WBG. One example of these agreements is the
EU-PLO agreement, which contains a dispute settlement clause. 314 Either party
may refer a dispute relating to the application or interpretation of the
Agreement to the Joint Committee.315 If the Joint Committee cannot settle the
dispute either party may appoint an arbitrator and the Joint Committee shall
appoint a third arbitrator. Each party to the dispute must take the steps required
to implement the decision of the arbitrator.316
Another example is the EFTA-PLO Agreement, which also contains an
arbitration procedure. 317 This agreement provides that disputes "which have
not been settled through consultation or in the Joint Committee within 6
314 Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation, Feb.
24, 1997 OJ (L 187), art. 67.
Either Party may refer to the Joint Committee any dispute relating to the application or
interpretation of this Agreement.
The Joint Committee may settle the dispute by means of a decision.
Each Party shall be bound to take measures involved in carrying out the decision referred to
in paragraph 2.
In the event of it not being possible to settle the dispute in accordance with paragraph 2
either Party may notify the other of the appointment of an arbitrator; the other Party must
then appoint a second arbitrator within two months.
The Joint Committee shall appoint a third arbitrator.
The arbitrators' decisions shall be taken by a majority vote.
Each party to the dispute must take the steps required to implement the decision of the
arbitrator.
315 Id.
316 id.
317 EFTA Agreement between the EFTA States and the PLO for the benefit of the
Palestinian Authority, Nov. 30, 1998, art. 29 (visited Mar. 11, 2000)
<http://www.efta.int/docs/EFTA.htm> (providing agreement in Adobe Acrobat format)
[hereinafter EFTA-PLO Agreement].
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months, may be referred to arbitration." 318 "The arbitral tribunal shall settle the
dispute in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and applicable
rules and principles of international law."319 "The award of the arbitral tribunal
shall be final and binding upon the parties to the dispute., 320 The agreement
further defines the make up of the arbitral tribunal and the autonomy of such
tribunal to determine the rules of procedure. 321 The Agreement does not
however determine which law shall be used, the language of the arbitration, the
place of the arbitration, etc.
While the EU and EFTA have arbitration mechanisms, none of the
bilateral agreements we have seen contain such a dispute resolution clause.
They should. The PA may want to include a provision in its new international
commercial arbitration act extending the Act's protections to those agreements
already in existence with PLO.
C. Agreements with Palestine's Trade Partners
The PA may want to explore entering into bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) with specific trade partners. 322 Indeed it has already begun to do so. The
323PNA has entered into an international trade agreement with Jordan, and anInterim Cooperation Agreement on Trade with Egypt,324 as well as a reciprocal
318 Id. EFTA-PLO Agreement, art. 29.
319 Id. EFTA-PLO Agreement, art. 29(3).
320 Id. art. 29(4).
321 Id. art. 29(2). ("The constitution and functioning of the arbitral tribunal is governed by
Annex VI.")
322 For a listing of over 1,300 BITs involving at least 160 states, see UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID- 1990s 159,
217; see also U.N. CONFERENCEThe World Bank Group, International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1996 (visited Feb. 4,
2000) <http:/www.worldbank.org/icsidltreaties/treaties.htm> (providing links to a list of
bilateral treaties for ISS countries).
323 See Agreement of Cooperation on Trade Matters Between the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan and the Palestine National Authority (signed Jan. 26, 1995, Amman, Jordan),
(published in Official Gazette issue no. 4028, p. 594, Mar. 1, 1995). Personal
Communication, Mahmoud Hmoud, Legal Advisor, Ministry Foreign Affairs, June 12,2000.
Earlier agreements with Jordan include The Economic Cooperation Agreement Between the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization dated Jan. 7, 1994,
endorsed by the Jordanian Cabinet on Jan. 8, 1994 and by the PLO Executive Committee on
Jan. 9, 1994. See 8 PALESTINE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 163 (1994/5) (Kluwer).
Further agreements were signed in a variety of areas including monetary and banking issues
(Id. at 167).
324 Signed February, 1997. Personal Communication with Saad al-Khatib, Ministry of
Trade, Palestinian Authority, Apr. 27, 2000. Saudi Arabia has unilaterally provided
preferential treatment for Palestinian agricultural products and processed foods admitting
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free trade agreement with Canada 325 and a preferred trade agreement with the
Czech Republic.326 The PNA states that it is negotiating trade agreements with
Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.327 The negotiations
with Turkey are on hold due to the negative effect such a free trade agreement
would have on nascent Palestinian industry.328 In 1994 the PLO entered into an
Agreement with the United States on Encouragement of Investment.
329
These treaties or agreements should define the treatment of foreign
investors, the conditions of expropriation and the measure of compensation
payable, the right to free transfer without delay of profits and other funds
associated with investments. For example, "[t]ypical language found in the
U.S. BITs provides that '[e]ach party shall provide effective means of asserting
claims and enforcing rights with resyect to investment, investment agreements,
and investment authorizations. " 33 This has been understood by the Model
OPIC Investment Incentive Agreement and many other BITs as requiring that
each country ensure access to international arbitration for settlement of
investment disputes.331 BITs provide investors with a variety of protections
them duty free. Personal Communication with Saad al-Khatib, Ministry of Trade, Palestinian
Authority, Sept. 14, 2000.
325 Joint Canadian-Palestinian Framework for Economic Cooperation and Trade Between
Canada and the Palestinian Liberation Organization on Behalf of the Palestinian Authority,
Feb. 27, 1999, <http://www.dfair-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/framework-e.asp> (visited June 6,
2000). See also BBC, Palestinian Authority, Canada Sign Free Trade Agreement, Mar. 9,
1999.
326 Personal Communication with Saad al-Khatib, Ministry of Trade, Palestinian
Authority, Apr. 27, 2000. See also Gregr in Favour of Trading with Palestine, World Rep.,
Dec. 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL 21340393.
327 See Trade Agreements (visited Feb. 24, 2000)
<http://www.palent.comlinv/trdagree.htm> (describing trade agreements with the European
Union, Jordan, and the United States, as well as other agreements being negotiated). See also
Jack I. Garvey, Regional Free Trade Dispute Resolution as Means for Securing the Middle
East Peace Process, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 147, at n. 23 (1999).
328 Personal Communication with Saad al-Khatib, Ministry of Trade, Palestinian
Authority, Apr. 27, 2000.
329 It should be noted that the agreement is with the PLO, not the PA, so as to maintain the
'fiction' that the PA was not dealing with foreign policy. See Agreement on Encouragement
of Investment Between the United States and the Palestine Liberation Organization for the
Benefit of the Palestinian Authority Pursuant to the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the
Territories Area, Aug. 11 & Sept. 12, 1994, available at 1994 WL 621519.
330 See e.g. language in Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection
of Investment, Sept. 29, 1982, U.S.-Egypt, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-24 (1986), 21 I.L.M.
927, 1982; and the more sophisticated Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and
Protection of Investment, July 2, 1997, U.S.-Jordan, 36 I.L.M. 1498.
331 See Robert C. O'Sullivan, Model OPIC Investment Incentive Agreement, art. III,
reprinted in I BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INT'L ECONOMIC L. (CCH) 665 (1990) (this model
agreement states the rights included in most U.S. bilateral investment agreements).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
from their investment including investment neutrality, investment security,
transparency, and significant investment protection against both private and
public infringement. -3 2 It typically calls, as well, for a structural dispute
resolution program. While some early BITs did not require third-party
arbitration, most contemporary BITs provide that:
an investor may compel the host state to submit any dispute involving the
interpretation or application of the BIT to binding, third party arbitration,
typically under the rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID). If the host state refuses to participate, the BIT
makes provision for an appointing authority to appoint arbitrators on behalf
of the host state so that the arbitration will go forward even without
cooperation of the host state. Any award issued by the arbitral tribunal will
be enforceable in municipal courts under the terms of the ICSID Convention
and the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards.33
The rights under a BIT are in addition to any dispute resolution procedures
provided in the investors' contract. BITs and Free Trade Agreements, like the
one between Israel and the United States, bear a strong similarity. Where a Free
Trade Agreement eliminates trade barriers for industrial entities between the
country parties, a BIT is intended to protect the individual investors and their
activities in the other contracting state.334 When they contain a modem and
specific commercial arbitration mechanism, BITs can give investors the level of
protection and comfort required when the contracting parties have major
cultural, political, economic, racial or religious differences.
D. The Dispute over the European Union Agreement and its Meaning
for a PA Arbitration Treaty
One dispute which some consider dispositive as to the limit of PA treaty
authority is the 1997 trade agreement entered into between the EU and PLO.336
In November 1995, as part of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, the
European Union and Israel concluded the EU-Israel Association Agreement3 37
332 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment
Regime, 19 MICH. J. INT'L. L 373, 395-99 (1998) (suggesting improvements to the BIT
language).
333 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The BIT Program: A Fifteen-Year Proposal, 86 AM. Soc'Y
INT'LL. PROC. 532, 538 (1992).
334 The term "state" is not used here to signify that only sovereign states can be party to
bilateral trade agreements.
335 Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation, Feb.
24, 1997 OJ (L 187) 3. See also EU/Palestine - Interim Association Agreement Signed by
Arafat - Kinkel Urges Europe to be Modest, Reuter Textline, February 25, 1997.
336 See Commission Communication of 8 March 1995 to the Council and the European
Parliament on Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Proposals for
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allowing Israeli goods to enter the European Union market duty free. The EU
limited the territorial scope of the Agreement to Israel's pre-1967 borders,
excluding "Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the
unilaterally annexed areas of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights."33
In 1997 the PLO, for the benefit of the PA, entered into an interim trade
agreement with the European Union.339 This agreement gives Palestine trade
advantages and access to EU funds to finance development projects. 340 The
agreement states that the objective of the cooperation between the EU and PA
will be to "approximate Palestinian Council legislation to that of the
Community, in the areas covered by the Agreement., 341 The Agreement
provides for arbitration of disputes in areas covered by the agreement, including
economic development and free trade between the EU and the PA.342
Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, COM (95) 72 final, reported in BULL. EUR.
UNION, Mar. 1995, point 1.4.57. See generally Jacqueline Klosek, Note, The Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, 8 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 173 (1996), for a discussion of the history
and background behind the partnership. The economic consequences of this agreement
region-wide are discussed in Alfred Tovias, The Economic Impact of the Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Area on Mediterranean Non-Member Countries, 2
MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS 113 (1997). The impact on Israel is discussed at 122-25. Id.
337 See Draft Association Agreement with Israel, EUR. COMM'N BULL. EuR. UNION, Nov.
1995, at § 1.4.69 at 81. The agreement builds on a 1975 Cooperation Agreement between
Israel and the (then) EEC. See Agreement Between the European Economic Community and
the State of Israel 1975 O.J. (L136)3. Cf. Daphna Kapeliuk-Klinger, A LegalAnalysis of the
Free Trade Agreement between the European Community and the State of Israel, 27 ISR. L.
REV. 415, 415 (1993) (providing that the 1975 agreement "set out to create a free trade area
in the territories of the contracting parties"). See id. See also 1975 O.. (L136) 3-9.
updated in Daphne Kapeliuk-Klinger, Legal Analysis of the Free Trade Agreement of 1975
between the European Community and the State of Israel (1995 University Press, Leuven)
(Leuven Law Series 1).
338 III. Exports to the European Community of Goods from Israeli Settlements in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights (last modified Sept. 1998)
<http:lwww.eu-del.org.illcode/commindex.html> (continuing implementation of the
Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Matters Between the European Community
and Israel) (constituting a communication from the European Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament) [hereinafter Community Communication].
339 Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement, 1997 OJ (L 187) 3. See also
EU/Palestine - Interim Association Agreement Signed by Arafat - Kinkel Urges Europe to be
Modest, supra note 335. In November 1998, the European Free Trade Association signed an
interim free trade agreement with the PLO which is to come into force in July 1999. See
Palestinians Sign Trade Pact with European Free Trade Assoc, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS
SERVICE, Nov. 30, 1998, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS.
340 See Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement, 1997 OJ (L 187) 3.
34' Id. art. 42.
342 Id. art. 67.
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As one can readily imagine this innocent language soon took on political
overtones. Two issues soon emerged; a conceptual question whether the PA
had the authority to sign the EU agreement under the powers given it under the
so-called "Paris Protocol" and the second whether the EU-PLO agreement
violates explicit terms of that Agreement.
E. The Jurisdictional Power to Sign
Article 38 of the EU/Israel Association Agreement provides that the
Agreement shall apply to the area covered by the State of Israel.343 The EU
argued that this area excludes WBG, claiming that prior to 1996 the PA was
not in existence to police the customs territory and since that time, an
Association Agreement has been signed with the Palestinians. 344
For its part, Israel argued that the Interim Agreement provides that the
final status negotiations not the EU-PLO Agreement shall cover such issues as
the delineation of borders.345 Until then there is only one "customs envelope"
which includes both Israel and the PA areas and as a result, products
originating in the PA areas should be regarded as Israeli goods under the
Association Agreement.346 Otherwise one would have two customs zones
covering two distinct entities: Israel and the PA347--in violation of the Paris
Accords..348
343 See Draft Association Agreement with Israel, supra note 337.
344 The issue came up regarding Israeli obstacles preventing exports to the EU of products
as if originating in Israel while they were effectively produced in: (i) the Israeli settlements,
East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights; and (ii) the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The communication discussed that Israel was exporting products to the EU that did not
originate in Israel. Community Communication, supra note 338. Protocol 4 of the EC-Israel
Interim Agreement specifies the origin criteria for categories of products. Products are
considered to have originated in Israel (i) if they are "wholly obtained in Israel," such as
vegetables grown and harvested in Israel, or (ii) products obtained in Israel which contain
materials not wholly obtained in Israel, provided that those material have undergone
sufficient working or processing in Israel within the meaning of the Protocol. The
communication states that Israel was (1) exporting to the European Community products
"from the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the Golan
Heights as if they were Israeli originating products; and (2)... products effectively produced
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as if they were Israeli originating products." Id.
345 Cf. Interim Agreement, art. X, supra note 1.
346 See Israeli Memorandum on Trade and Economic Relations between Israel and the
European Community 1, 4 (Israel Sept. 29, 1997).
347 Europe Moves Toward Israel on Forged Juice and Exports, ISRAEL Bus. TODAY, Sept.
15, 1998; see also Community Communication, supra note 338, at section III ("All relevant
United Nations Security Council Resolutions lead to the conclusion that neither Israeli
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, nor East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, can
be considered as part of the State of Israel .... these United Nations Security Council
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The Israelis claim that the EU -PLO Agreement does not respect the Paris
Protocol notion of a single Israeli-PA "customs envelope."3 49 Israel claims that
the EU, through its agreement with Palestine, treats WBG as a separate customs
territory, and the PA as having full competence "in the field of external trade
relations to fulfill its rights and obligations under the EU -PLO Agreement.
350
Thus, the Israelis claim the EU - PLO Agreement is in violation of the Paris
Protocol.
3 51
Another disputed issue is the definition of "economic agreements., 352 The
Interim Agreement allows the PLO to sign economic agreements with third
parties, on behalf of the PA, however, the PA itself is specifically precluded
from entering the sphere of foreign relations. When the PA is acting within the
approved spheres of cultural, scientific, economic and educational agreements,
its actions are not considered foreign relations under the Interim Agreement.
353
The reality however, is that "it's practically impossible to separate economics
from politics, especially when it comes to actions of a third party."354 The EU's
reading of the Interim Agreement allows the Palestinians, through the PLO, to
sign their own trade agreements with third parties (countries or entities), while
Israel claims that the Interim Agreement allows only economic cooperation
agreements, not independent trade agreements.
355
resolutions may be regarded as legally binding, or at least as an authoritative interpretation of
international law.")
348 See id. Israel further pointed out that once products originated in the EU are imported
into Israel, they are "legally and de facto in free circulation within all areas under its control
and within the 'customs envelope"'; thus "free access" should be in both directions within
the principles underlying the Israel-EU contractual relations. Id. at 5.
349 Annex V, Protocol on Economic Relations (Paris Protocol) to Israeli Palestinian
Interim Agreement (Sept. 28, 1995).
350 See supra note 346, at 5.
351 See Annex V, supra note 349; see also Europe Moves Toward Israel on forged Juice
and Exports, ISRAELBUSINESS TODAY, Sept. 15, 1998 ("Israel simply does notrecognize this
agreement; from its perspective there is only one economic agreement between itself and the
EU ... Israel speaks of a single customs zone that includes it and the PA areas; but Europe
refers to two customs zones covering two discrete entities, Israel and the PA."). See also
European Commission Memorandum on Trade and Economic Relations Between Israel and
the European Community (July 24, 1997) (requesting that Israel "allow the full
implementation of the E.C.-PLO Interim Association Agreement... especially its economic
protocol"). Israel has interpreted this as asking Israel and the "PLO-PA to infringe the Paris
Protocol and Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement." See supra note 346, at 5. Israel claims
that this will scuttle the peace process, and that is something that Israel will not do. Id.
352 Id.
353 Thus, preventing the PA from acting in any way that could influence its international
status.
354 HA'ARETZ, The power of the weak (July 22, 1998) <http://www.haaretz.co.il>.
355 See Reading the EU, THE JERUSALEM POsT, May 22, 1998, at 16.
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Further, Israel has argued that the EU-PLO agreement is not an
"economic" agreement, as defined by the Peace Accords.356 It is hard to
understand this argument. While Israel can properly claim the "two envelope"
model is in violation of the Paris Accords, it cannot claim that economic
agreements entered into for "the benefit of the PA" per se violate the Paris
Accords. Rather, any such agreement must be "compatible with the Interim
Agreement.,
357
In April 1999, Israel "expressed a readiness to 'acknowledge' (although
not formally recognise) [sic] the existence of the interim trade agreement
between the EU and the PLO, but once again, Israel and the EU disagreed on
the territorial coverage of the agreement."358 The deputy director-general for
Israeli economic affairs at the Foreign Ministry said .'[w]e will facilitate the
implementation of the EU-PLO agreement ... on condition that it does not
contradict the Paris protocol... and does not prejudge any kind of political
subject that is on the agenda of the final settlement."' 359-The EU has recognized
that, "[i]n practice .... full implementation of the [EU-PLO] Agreement is not
feasible unless Israel allows it to take place. '36° In any event, since the recent
election in Israel (and unconnected internal EU management scandals in
Brussels) the EU has seemingly dropped the issue so as "not to upset the peace
process. 361
To the extent to which Israel's acquiescence to the EU-PLO agreement
can be understood as a waiver of the foreign affairs preclusion in the Paris
Accords it may open the way for Palestine to sign multilateral conventions
ordinarily limited to states (such as the New York Convention) if both sides
agreed that such a signing in no way should be understood as a general waiver
of Israel's rights under the Paris Accords. Given Israel's interest in promoting
both Palestinian economic growth and Palestinian integration into a global legal
regimen such consent might be mutually beneficial.
356 See generally Singer, supra note 290; John Quigley, The Israel-PLO Interim
Agreements: Are They Treaties?, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 717 (1997).
357 See supra note 346.
358 See Alan George, Israel Wins First Round of Trade War with EC, MIDDLE E., May
1999, at 9.
359 See David Zev Harris, EU: Israel Notes EU-PA Trade Pact, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 11,
1998, at 12. But see, Alan George, Tempers cool on EU-Israel Trade Conflicts, MIDDLE E.,
Jan. 1999, at 43 (stating that Israel refuses to recognize the EU-PLO agreement because it
conflicts with the Paris Protocol).
360 Community communication, supra note 240, at IV.a.
361 Judy Dempsey, Israeli Exports Breach EU Trade Agreements Rules on Origin,
Brussels Aims for Diplomatic Solution over Products Made in Jewish Settlements, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 29, 2000, at 14.
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XI. DoMEsTIc VERSUS INTERNATIONAL ARBrIRATION LAWS
There is a growing consensus among international law scholars and
practitioners that it is preferable to keep international arbitration laws separate
from domestic arbitration laws.3 62 This is particularly true in the Middle East
where there is a history of informal domestic arbitration and mediation. The
majority of Middle East States have laws that support enforcement of domestic
arbitration decisions, but do not always include enforcement of international
arbitration decisions.36  Many of the domestic arbitrations are based on
religious principles and traditions.3 64 And indeed, domestic laws are often
inappropriate for "the special needs and features of international arbitration. 365
Foreign investors, often unfamiliar with these practices, have greater
confidence in international dispute resolution mechanisms in what may be
referred to as an international, neutral, and more familiar, forum.
XII. NATIONAL LAWS AND THE COURTS
The national laws of the country where an international arbitration takes
place or where an award is to be enforced are of primary importance.366 The
arbitration authority comes not only by agreement between the parties but also
362 See Albert Jan Van Den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958 and the
Arab Countries, 1 EURO-ARAB ARBITRATION CONFERENCE 54, 58-59 (1987); see also EL-
AHDAB, supra note 55 at 157 ("[N]ational commerce has rules and customs which are quite
different from those of international commerce. An arbitration act which is good for national
commerce is not necessarily so for international commerce.").
363 See Fathi Kemicha, Future Perspectives on International Commercial Arbitration in
the Arab Countries, in INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN A CHANGING WORLD 225 (Albert Jan Van den
Berg ed., 1993)
364 The notion of arbitration in Muslim Law is very different from the Western conception
of arbitration. See El-Abdab, supra note 225 (according to Muslim-law, when a Muslim is
party to the controversy, Muslim law, as applicable to Muslims, govern the controversy
including the Muslim notion of public order). A solution for countries that have domestic
arbitration "based on long traditions" is to "introduce a new law specifically dealing with
international arbitrations within their own country.... The adoption of the Model Law may
be the easiest solution for countries wishing to have a separate law for international
arbitration." Van Den Berg, supra note 362, at 59.
365 Herrman, supra note 111, at 486.
366 "[T]he various conventions relating to international commercial arbitration... operate
through the national law of those states which have agreed to be bound by them." REDFERN,
supra note 91, at 68. "[T]he national legal systems are of central importance because...
[they] determine the validity and the effect of the arbitration agreement... [as well as]
incorporate and implement any pertinent international conventions." Biihring-Uhle, supra
note 93, at 55-56. "National law.., gives arbitration its legally binding character." William
W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in
InternationalArbitration, 63 TuL. L. REV. 647, 656 (1989).
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from the legal systems that support the arbitral process.367 National laws and the
courts play a pivotal role in international arbitration.
The last decade has shown an increase in national legislation that respects
the autonomy of the arbitral process from court intervention and supervision.
368
This is true "even [in] countries that were traditionally hostile to international
commercial arbitration." 369 The UNCITRAL Model Law has been instrumental
in effecting this trend.370 The majority of these national laws "provide for:
enforcement of arbitration agreements; court assistance with the conduct of the
arbitration proceedings; fewer mandatory procedural rules and less court
interference with arbitration proceedings; a limited scope of judicial review of
arbitral awards rendered with the jurisdiction; and limited grounds under which
local courts can refuse the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards. 37 1 An arbitration award will have a binding effect only if its res
judicata effect is recognized and enforced by the national courts.3 7 2 States need
to integrate arbitration, as a mechanism of resolving commercial disputes, and
the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards into their national laws. In order to
ensure the utility of international arbitration proceedings national legal systems
must be structured so that arbitration is binding and to provide a system of
arbitration that is highly regarded for its level of integrity.
373
XI. A SUGGESTED INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ACT FOR PALESTINE
With the support of the World Bank, the PA Ministry of Justice recently
proposed a draft legislation on arbitration.374 While the Draft Legislation is a
367 See Park, supra note 366, at 657. These legal systems include (i) the law used to
enforce an arbitration agreement; (ii) the law which provides for recognition and
enforcement of an arbitration award; and (iii) the law of the situs of the arbitration hearing.
See id.
368 See Btihring -Uhle, supra note 93, at 59-60.
369 Id. at 59.
370 See id. at 60.
371 Id. at 59-60. Despite its potential for abuse, a minimum standard of court review
operates as a safeguard to public policy (international or domestic) and is desirable to ensure
the quality for dispute resolution. However, appeals on the merits are not acceptable in the
modem climate, even if limited to points of law. See REDFERN, supra note 91, at 435.
[T]he modern trend is against challenges to an award on the basis of mistake in fact or law
.... This is in line with the growing conviction that, as far as international commercial
arbitrations are concerned, the parties should be prepared to accept the decision of the
arbitral tribunal.
Id.
372 See Park, supra note 116, at 91.
373 See Park, supra note 366, at 658.
374 Draft Legislation on Arbitration (Nov. 1999) (Palestine) [hereinafter Draft Legislation],
translated in JIL at Appendix A. The Draft Legislation was submitted to the Palestinian
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vast improvement from the existing arbitration laws currently applicable in the
WBG, it falls short of providing the PA with a transparent arbitration law that
reflects international standards. We have reviewed the Draft Legislation as well
as earlier drafts.3 5 Looking to the Model Law and the experience of other
countries which have adopted the Model Law we make the following
suggestions for drafting an International Commercial Arbitration Act for
Palestine.
We suggest that Palestine carve out a specific international commercial
arbitration law (the "Act") from its proposed domestic and international draft
376
statute. That law should be based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, taking
advantage of the international transparency of an established model.377 While
certain changes are necessary to accommodate local conditions in Palestine, the
transparent framework of the Model Law is ensured when the drafters do not
radically change the model. 378 An added advantage of the Model Law is that
Arabic is one of the Model's six official languages 37 9 The Draft Legislation
contains several provisions that are similar to the Model Law; however, the
structure of the Draft Legislation is not the same as the Model Law, thereby
taking away the advantage of transparency and familiarity which the Model
Law brings with it.
380
We propose that the suggested Act apply only to international commercial
arbitrations. While an integrated law may appear simpler, we recommend that
the PA keep their domestic and international arbitration laws separate at this
time. Domestic arbitration in Palestine is filled with local particularities and is
legislature in November 1999. We are working from a non-official translation of the
November draft.
375 See, e.g., Draft Legislation on Arbitration (April 1999) (Palestine), art. 8 (unofficial
English translation on file with the authors).
376 While the November 1999 version of the Draft Legislation on Arbitration does separate
domestic and international arbitration it does so within the same Act thus causing
considerable confusion as to what clauses apply. See Draft Legislation, supra note 374,
translated in JIL Appendix A.
377 "[Ain acceptable law for international commercial arbitration ... should be of good
quality with solutions that are sound and suitable to the specific needs of international
arbitration; it should be easily recognizable and understandable to foreign users; and,
building on these two conditions, it should be similar to the law of many other States
embodying generally recognized principles .... [A]ll [these] conditions are best met by
legislation that follows, as closely as possible, the UNCITRAL Model Law."
Gerold Herrman, Presentation of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 3 EURO-ARAB ARBITRATION
165, 168-69 (1991).
378 See id. at 169.
319 Id. at 171.
3W For example, the Model Law has 36 clearly defined articles, whereas the Draft
Legislation has 58 articles. See Model Law, supra note 112, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1302; see
also Draft Legislation, supra note 374, translated in JIL Appendix A.
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geared toward domestic participants who are familiar with Palestinian culture.
In contrast, international commercial arbitration is specifically geared to meet
the needs of global business and private investors with the transparency and
certainty they need to invest in a developing country. Thus, like the
UNCITRAL Model Law, the PA's international commercial arbitration act
should apply only to international arbitrations, 381 allowing domestic arbitration
to continue while providing foreign practitioners with transparency and
mitigating any fears of local particularities. At present, the Draft Legislation
applies to every arbitration and does not provide for a separate law for
international commercial arbitrations. The proposed PA modifications to the
UNCITRAL Model law include those discussed below.
A. Arbitration Agreement
1. Mediation
We propose that the Palestinian Draft arbitration law include language
providing that once a dispute has been submitted for arbitration there will be a
38230 to 60 day waiting period. During that period the parties shall use best
381 Like Hong Kong, if the PA desires, it can amend its law in the future to include
domestic arbitration. See Reformation of Hong Kong Arbitration Law Enters Next Phase,
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB., June 28, 1998, at 17. In 1990, Hong Kong enacted an international
commercial arbitration act based on the Model Law while keeping domestic arbitration
separate. See id. In 1996 Hong Kong began looking at changing to a unitary system
bringing the domestic arbitration law in line with the Model Law. See id.
382 "Arabic and Islamic societies are known for their emphasis on conciliation." Bernardo
M. Cremades, Overcoming the Clash of Legal Cultures: The Role of Interactive Arbitration
in Conflicting Legal Cultures in Commercial Arbitration, Old Issues and New Trends, in
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE CORPORATE AND FINANCIAL LAW 147, 150 (1999). "Arab and
Islamic societies chacterized by the existence of a strong commercial system to promote
amicable settlement of disputes through negotiation/mediation is a first step that could lead
ultimately at a later stage to conciliation/arbitration." (quoting Ahmed Sadelc-El-Kosheri
from his 1996 ICCA Conference Report). Id. This is also practiced widely throughout Asia.
See Yasuhei Taniguchi, The Changing Attitude to International Commercial Dispute
Settlement in Asia and the Far East, 1997 ARB. & DisP. RESOL. L.J. 67, 74-75 (describing
the Asian emphasis on conciliation); see also Andrew Sagartz, Resolution of International
Commercial Disputes: Surmounting Barriers of Culture Without Going to Court, 13 OHIO J.
DisP. RESOL. 675, 700,705 (1998) (discussing the optimal situation of combining
conciliation and arbitration in international commercial dispute settlement). See generally
David W. Plant, Mediation in International Commercial Arbitration: Some Practical
Aspects, 4 J. INT'L & COMP. L. 329 (discussing the fundamental, practical, and ethical
considerations of informal resolution prior to arbitration); Steve Burton, Combining
Conciliation with Arbitration of International Commercial Disputes, 18 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 637 (discussing a combination of conciliation and arbitration as a way to
settle international disputes). UNCITRAL is considering dealing with the issue of
conciliation (mediation) prior to arbitration at its March 2000 meeting. UNCITRAL
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383
efforts to resolve the dispute through mediation. During that period the
parties shall use best efforts to resolve the dispute through mediation. If the
parties are note successful, the dispute shall then proceed to arbitration.
2. Definition of Dispute
The Model Law provides that an arbitration agreement is "an agreement
by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have risen or
which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship,
whether contractual or not. An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an
arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement., 384 The
Model Law also provides that the "agreement shall be in writing."385 The Draft
Legislation provides a similar definition of arbitration agreement as well as
requires that agreement be in writing." 386 The Draft Legislation requires if
arbitration is agreed upon following a dispute, that the agreement should
include the subject of the arbitration, otherwise it is considered invalid.387 The
Draft Legislation is not clear whether it requires that all agreements to arbitrate
include the subject of arbitration; if so, it narrows the application of the
arbitration law quite a bit.388 We propose that the Act follow the Model Law'sbroad definition of Arbitration Agreement.
3. Definition of "Commercial"
The UNCITRAL Model Law provides, in a footnote, that the term
"commercial" in commercial arbitration should be given broad interpretation.389
Considering Possible Future Work, 54 DIsp. RESOL. J. 7 (Aug. 1999). The most popular
addition to the model law is the issue of mediation. See Herrman, supra note 111, at 496.
383 This idea is also stated in the 1998 Investment Law. See Revised Investment Law,
supra note 5, art. 41(A) ("Either party to a dispute must request good faith negotiations
before it may have access to the dispute resolution procedures...").
384 The Model Law, supra note 112, art. 7(1).
385 The Model Law, supra note 112, art. 7(2).
386 Draft Legislation, supra note 374, art. 5, translated in JIL Appendix A.
An arbitration agreement is an agreement between two or more parties which stipulates to
refer all or part of the dispute that results or may result in the future from disagreement on a
particular legal relationship whether it is binding or non-binding. The arbitration agreement
can be a condition appearing on a separate contract or agreement.
The Arbitration Agreement must be in writing.
Draft Legislation, supra note 374, art. 5, translated in JIL Appendix A.
387 Id. art. 5(4), translated in JIL Appendix A.
388 Id., translated in JIL Appendix A.
389 Model Law, art. 1, supra note 112:
The term "commercial" should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters arising
from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not. Relationships of
2000]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
The Law Concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters includes the
definition of commercial in the text and provides that an arbitration is
commercial if the dispute arises out of a legal relationship having an economic
nature.390 The New Egyptian Law also provides that an arbitration is
commercial if the dispute arises out of a legal relationship having an economic
nature. The New Omani Arbitration Act presents a broad definition of
commercial arbitration. 391 The Draft Legislation applies to international
"dispute[s] over economic, trade and civil issues."392 We propose that the PA
follow the Draft Legislation and broadly define the term commercial within the
text of the Act to include transactions that involve international commerce,
including any special items surrounding the industrial zone area, as well as
relationships which have an economic nature, while excluding "civil issues"
from the definition.
B. Definition of "International"
The Model Law provides that an arbitration is "international" if the parties
"have their places of business in different states," the place of arbitration or
substantive part of the relationship is outside the state in which the parties have
their business, or "if the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of
the arbitration agreement relates to more than one country., 393 In reference to
subject matter, the New Egyptian Law requires only that it relate to more than
a commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the following transactions: any trade
transactions for the supply or exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement;
commercial representation or agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works;
consulting; engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation
agreement or concession; joint venture and other forms of industrial or business co-
operation; carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, rail or road.
Id.
390 New Egyptian Law, supra note 126, provides that an arbitration is commercial if:
the dispute arose over a legal relationship of an economic nature, [which included (but is
not limited to)] ...the supply of commodities or services, commercial agencies,
construction and engineering or technical know-how contracts, the granting of industrial,
touristic and other licenses, technology transfer, investment and development contracts,
banking, insurance and transport operations, exploration and extraction of natural wealth,
energy supply, the laying of gas or oil pipelines, the building of roads and tunnels, the
reclamation of agricultural land, the protection of the environment and the establishment
of nuclear reactors.
391 Act on Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters, issued July 28, 1997; published in
the Omani Official Gazette, No. 602, English version published in 10 W.T.A.M., January
1998 [hereinafter Omani Act]. The New Omani Arbitration Act resembles the Egyptian Act
on arbitration issued in 1994. See EI-Ahdab, supra note 275, at 60. The Egyptian Act is
modeled on the UNCITRAL Model Law. See id.
392 See Draft Legislation, supra note 374, art. 3, translated in JIL Appendix A.
393 The Model Law, art. 1(3), supra note 112.
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one state, not that the parties expressly agree.394 The Draft Legislation provides
a broad definition of an international arbitration that includes: when the subject
matter is commercial and the headquarters of the parties are in different
countries; when the subject of dispute involves more than one country; and
when the place of arbitration or implementing the commitments, or place
closely related to the subject of the dispute is located in another country. 5 We
suggest that the PA follow a modified version of the Draft Legislation's broad
definition combining "commercial" and "international", thereby giving the
parties the benefit of the doubt while not requiring that the parties expressly
agree. 396
C. Place of Arbitration
The provisions of the Model Law "apply only if the place of arbitration is
in the territory of this State. ' 397 Both Germany and Egypt have removed the
requirement "only if the place of arbitration is in this State."398 The Draft
394 New Egyptian Law, supra note 126, art 3(3).
395 Draft Legislation, supra note 374, art. 3(2), translated in JIL Appendix A.
Arbitration is considered international when its subject is a dispute over economic, trade or
civil issues in the following cases:
a. When the headquarters of the parties to arbitration are located in different countries at
the time of signing the arbitration agreement. If a party has several headquarters, the more
frequently used one is the one that relates to the arbitration agreement. If a party does not
have a headquarters, the party's usual residence is the one that relates to the arbitration
agreement.
b. If the subject of dispute in the arbitration agreement involves more than one country.
c. If the central headquarters of the parties to arbitration is located in the same country at
the time of signing the arbitration agreement, and if one of the following places is located
in another country:
c. 1 The place where the arbitration occurs as designated by the arbitration agreement or if
reference is made as to how it should be designated.
c.2 The place of implementing a substantial part of the commitments resulting from trade
relations between the parties.
c.3 The place that is closely related to the subject of the dispute.
396 We suggest removing the term civil from the definition, as well as removing the
language regarding residence.
"' Model Law, art. 1(2), supra note 112. Any reference to "this State" in the Model Law
shall refer to the area under the control of the Palestinian Authority and is not used to imply
that by enacting an international commercial arbitration act Palestine is declaring statehood.
398 New Egyptian Law, supra note 126, art. 1. "The provision of this Law shall apply to
all arbitrations between public law or private law persons, whatever the nature of the legal
relationship around which the dispute revolves, when such arbitration is conducted is Egypt
or when the parties to an international commercial arbitration conducted abroad agree to
subject it to the provisions of this law." Id. See Berger, supra note 277.
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Legislation seems to apply to international arbitrations taking place in Palestine
as well as foreign arbitrations occurring outside Palestine, but it does not
specifically state where the provisions apply.399 We suggest that the PA follow
the Model Law, but like Germany and Egypt remove the word "only" from the
Model Law text, thereby expressly providing that the Act be applied in
Palestine or abroad, provided the parties agree to be subject to the Act. This is a
particularly important point for the PA at this time because it is recommended
that international commercial arbitrations take place outside the WBG in a state
that is party to the New York Convention (or other convention providing for the
recognition of foreign awards), until such time as the PA's international
commercial arbitration law is established. 400 This will help to protect the PA as
well as foreign investors by giving the award a more binding effect outside the
WBG.
40 1
D. Concept of Party Autonomy
One of fundamental concepts of an international arbitration is party
autonomy. 4°2 Party autonomy in this context is defined as "the autonomy of the
parties to decide on all aspects of an international arbitration procedure, subject
only to certain limitations of mandatory law."403 These concepts are expressly
provided in the articles of the Model Law which provides the parties the
399 Draft Legislation, supra note 374, art. 2, translated in JIL Appendix A ("subject to art.
4 of the Law, this Law shall apply to every arbitration between natural or legal persons,
having full capacity over the rights involved in the matter subject to arbitration and in
accordance with the international agreements to which Palestine adheres.")
400 "As the arbitration law of the place of arbitration plays an important role in
international arbitration, it is equally important to chose a country which has an adequate
arbitration law. That country should also be Party to the New York Arbitration Convention
of 1958." Van Den Berg, supra note 362, at 57.
401 Use of foreign courts is currently not a common practice in Palestine. For example,
"although a Palestinian businessman importing from or exporting to a foreign country could
theoretically use that country's courts to resolve contract disputes, this is rarely if ever done.
In fact, according to one Gazan entrepreneur, in over 30 years of doing business
internationally, he has been involved on only one lawsuit utilizing a foreign court.
"Interview with Sa'ad Hirzallah, June 14, 1995." Qayyum and Rasmussen, supra note 26, at
27 n. 28.
402 Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, The Role of Party Autonomy in International Arbitration, 52
SUM. DisP. RESOL. J. 24, 24 (1997) (The principle of party autonomy is fundamental to
arbitration in general and to international arbitration in particular). See e.g. New Egyptian
Law, supra note 390, art 13; Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23, §§1, 34, 46 (Eng.); the Dutch
Arbitration of 1986, van den Berg, van Delden, Snijders, Netherlands Arbitration Law 56
(Deventer, Boston 1993) (Arts. 1036 and 1054); the French Nouveau Code de Procedure
Civile (Arts. 1449 and 1496); and the Swiss PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ACT OF 1987,
Lalive, Poudret, Reymond, Le Droit de l'Arbitrage Interne et International en Suisse 348
(Lausanne 1989) (Arts. 182 and 187).
403 Bockstiegel, supra note 402, at 25.
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autonomy to agree on: the number of arbitrators;4°4 the procedure appointing
the arbitrator(s);4°5 "the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in
conducting the proceedings; ',406 "the languages) to be used in the arbitral
proceedings; 40 and the place of arbitration. These concepts of party
autonomy should be included as an integral part of the Act.
E. Laws
It is recommended that the parties to an agreement to arbitrate choose as
governing law an established legal system that is outside of the WBG, at least
until the laws in the WBG are more defined and transparent to investors. The
Model Law provides that the parties can choose "the procedure to be followed
by the tribunal" as well as "the rules of law ... applicable to the substance of
the dispute.'4 9 The Draft Legislation provides that the parties can agree on the
rules of procedure and the rule of law to be applied to the arbitration.4 10 If the
parties fail to agree, the Arbitration Commission shall choose the most suitable
law.41' The Draft Legislation further provides that if the arbitration is
international, the "procedure stipulated by the law chosen by the parties" is
applied; if there is a conflict, "the principles of the Laws of Palestine" are
applied.412 We suggest that the PA follow the language of the Model Law
regarding party autonomy.
F. Language
The Model law provides that "[t]he parties are free to agree on the
language to be used in the arbitral proceeding.', 413 Failing such agreement by
the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the language to be used in the
proceedings. The Draft Legislation provides that" arbitration is to be carried
out in Arabic, unless otherwise stated by the parties.' 414  If the parties use
different languages, the Commission will choose the arbitration language to be
404 Model Law, art. 10(1), supra note 112.
405 See id. art. 11(2).
4o6 Id. at art. 19(1). "The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such
rules of law as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute." Id.,
art. 28(1).
407 Id. art. 22(1).
401 See id. art. 20(1).
409 Model Law, supra note 112, arts. 19(1), 28(1).
410 Draft Legislation, supra note 374, arts. 18 & 20, translated in JIL Appendix A.
411 Draft Legislation, supra note 387, art. 18, translated in JIL Appendix.
412 Draft Legislation, supra note 374, art. 19, translated in JIL Appendix A.
413 Model Law, art. 22, supra note 112.
414 Draft Legislation, supra note 374, art 22, translated in JIL Appendix A.
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used. 415 The New Egyptian Law provides that, unless the parties have agreed to
another language, the arbitration shall be conducted in Arabic.416 We suggest
that the Act provide that the parties make the language determination in the first
instance, failing such provision, the arbitral tribunal can determine the language
to be used, designating Arabic as the default language.
G. Court involvement
The Model Law follows "the trend in favour of limiting court involvement
in international commercial arbitration," reflecting the view "that parties to an
arbitration agreement.., prefer expediency and finality to protracted court
battles.' Article 5 of the Model Law states that the reader will find all
instances of possible court intervention in the Law, and beyond such instances,
"no court shall intervene. ' '418 These instances are divided into two groups. The
first group refers to the arbitrators and comprises appointment, challenge and
terminations of the mandate of an arbitrator (art. 11, 13 and 14), jurisdiction of
the arbitral tribunal (art. 16) and setting aside of the arbitral award (art 34).419
The Model Law provides that a specially designated court should perform these
420functions. The second group comprises court assistance in taking evidence(art. 27), recognition of the arbitration agreement (art. 8 and 9), and recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards (art. 35 and 36). The Draft Legislation
provides for a "designated court" for an international arbitration shall be "the
court of first instance in Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine or the temporary site
in Gaza.",421 The courts in Palestine are overburdened with cases and it is
important the enforcement of arbitration agreements and enforcement of awards
not get caught up in the delays. We suggest that the PA follow the Model Law
and further suggest that the PA actually create an expedited system for
arbitration matters, thereby encouraging parties to resolve commercial disputes
outside of the already overburdened court system. Further, it is essential to the
success of the Act that the Courts respect the Parties' autonomy.
415 See id. art. 22, translated in JIL Appendix A.
416 New Egyptian Law, supra note 126, art. 29.
417 See Explanatory Note, supra note 278.
418 Model Law, art. 5, supra note 112. This assurance that the reader does not have to
search outside of the Act is quite valuable to the foreign practitioner who is not familiar with
the particularities of each country.
419 See id.
420 Id. art. 6.
421 Draft Legislation, supra note 374, art. 1, translated in JIL Appendix A.
When the arbitration is international and takes place in Palestine, the designated court is the
court of first instance that has jurisdiction over the matter. In the case of a foreign
arbitration, the designated court is the court of first instances in Jerusalem, the capital of
Palestine or the temporary site of Gaza.
Draft Legislation, supra note 374, art. 1, translated in JIL Appendix A.
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H. Arbitrators
1. Nationality
The Model Law provides that "[n]o person shall be precluded by reason of
his nationality from acting as an arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties.' 422 The Omani law contains a provision not foreseen in the Model Law.
The Omani law provides that it is not required that the arbitrator be of a given
gender or nationality unless the parties agree otherwise.423 The Draft Law is
silent on this matter. Although the April draft law contained a clause providing
that "[n]o person is prevented from acting as an arbitrator because of his
nationality, as long as the parties do not agree to the contrary," it was removed
from the November draft, which makes the default composition to be "agreed
upon by the parties." 424 We suggest that the Act include language similar to the
Omani law, thereby allowing a greater pool of arbitrators from which to
choose.
2. Number
The Model Law provides that the parties can determine the number of
arbitrators; however, if the parties do not provide for a number of arbitrators,
the "number... shall be three.' 425 The Draft Legislation provides the parties
can agree on the composition of the arbitrator commission-meaning number
and individuals; if the number is more than one, the arbitrators "shall designate
an arbitrator with a casting vote.' '426 The draft further provides that "[t]he
arbitrator must have legal capacity and shall enjoy full civil rights and shall not
be convicted of a crime, felony, or misdemeanor, be adjudicated bankrupt or be
found guilty of dishonor.' '4 7 We agree that the parties should have the
autonomy to determine the number of arbitrators, but in an effort to keep
arbitration costs reasonable, suggest that the default number be one arbitrator.
We agree that the parties should have the autonomy to appoint an arbitrator or
arbitrators of their choosing. The Draft legislation further provides that the
court may appoint an arbitrator whose name appears on the list of certified
arbitrators recognized by the Department of Justice.428 While this list may be
helpful, it should only be a suggested list. It is important to keep the arbitration
process unbiased.
422 Model Law, art. 11, supra note 112.
423 Omani Act, supra note 391, art 16(2).
424 Draft Legislation, supra note 374, art. 8, translated in JIL Appendix A.
425 Model Law, art. 10, supra note 112.
426 Draft Legislation, supra note 374, art 8, translated in JIL Appendix A.
427 Id. art. 9, translated in JIL Appendix A..
41 Id. art. 11, translated in JIL Appendix A.
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3. Challenge
The Model law provides that an arbitrator may not be challenged except
where circumstances give rise to serious doubt of his impartiality or
independence. 429 The Omani Arbitration Act further provides that an arbitrator
must accept his mission in writing, and at the time of acceptance "the arbitrator
must point out any circumstances likely to give rise to doubts as to his
independence or impartiality. If such circumstances arise out of his
appointment or during the proceedings, the arbitrator must take the initiative to
inform the parties to the arbitration and the other arbitrators thereof."430 The
Draft Legislation provides that "[t]he Commission should underline, when
accepting the arbitration, the duty of neutrality and impartiality." 431 We suggest
that the PA Act adopt a writing requirement for arbitrators as well as a
requirement to point out, at any time, circumstances likely to give rise to doubts
as to his independence or impartiality.
4. Law
The Model Law provides that "[t]he arbitral tribunal shall decide the
dispute in accordance with such rules of law as are chosen by the parties as
applicable to the substance of the dispute... [and flailing any designation by
the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of
laws rules which it considers applicable." 4 32 The New Egyptian Law provides
that the parties have "the right to agree on the procedures to be followed by the
Arbitral Tribunal." And that in absence of agreement the arbitral tribunal does
not have to resort to the conflicts of laws rules but rather, at its own discretion,
suitable. 433 Germany, Italy, and Switzerland all apply the classic test to
determine the law applicable to contract relations: look to the "law of the state
with which the subject matter is most closely connected." 434 The Draft
Legislation is now silent on the matter.435 The April draft provided if the
parties fail to agree on the law to be used in an international arbitration taking
place in Palestine, Palestinian rules of law apply.436 We suggest that the PA not
follow the "classic test" but that the Act provide that, where the parties have not
specifically stated which law is to be used in their agreement, the arbitral
429 Model Law, art. 12, supra note 112.
430 Omani Act, supra note 39,1 art. 19(3).
431 Draft Legislation, supra note 374, art. 12, translated in JIL Appendix A.
432 Model Law, art. 28, supra note 112.
433 New Egptian Law, supra note 126, art. 25.
434 Berger, supra note 277, at 46, citing The New German Arbitration Law, available and
translated at <http://www.uni-muenster.de/Jura.iwr/englishlberger/resar/lOZpoe.html> at
sec. 1051 para. 2.
435 Draft Legislation, supra note 374, translated in JIL Appendix A.
436 Draft legislation, supra note 374, art. 20.
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tribunal has the freedom to determine, in its discretion, the rules of law to be
applied, takn into account "the principles that govern relations between the
two parties.' It is important that the Act state that the Palestinian courts will
honor the choice of law made by either the parties or the arbitral tribunal.
438
This is especially important in the WBG, where the laws are still developing. It
is recommended that the arbitration committee draft a model arbitration clause
that includes clearly defined terms (law, rules, place and language) that is
available for inclusion in commercial agreements.
a. Enforcement of Foreign Awards
The Model Law provides that a party applying for enforcement of an
award "shall supply the duly authenticated original award or... certified copy
thereof, the original arbitration agreement[,]" and (3) if the agreement is not in
the official language of the state, "a certified translation." 439 The Draft
legislation provides that a party applying for registration of the award should
provide the court with: (a) certified copy of the foreign award, "authenticated
by the Palestinian political or consular representative in the country where the
decision was issued," and (2) an Arabic translation "by a legal translator whose
signature is authenticated by the political or consular Palestinian representative
in the country of the applicant or is certified by a Palestinian translator. ' 440 We
suggest the Draft Legislation requirements are too onerous and may, at this
time, be impossible to fulfill, as there are many states that do not have a
Palestinian political or consular representatives. We further suggest that the Act
follow the Model Law.
b. Setting Aside an Award
The Model Law provides that an application for setting aside of the
arbitral award can be made if the court finds that "(i) the subject matter of the
dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of this State, or
(ii) the award is in conflict with public policy of this State.'' The Draft
Legislation provides that the court can refuse to record or implement a foreign
arbitration decision if it "contradicts the general law in Palestine [or] [i]f the
decision is not compatible with international conventions and agreements in
force in Palestine. The Draft Legislation further provides that the "law does
not apply ... [in c]ases concerning public order in Palestine;" "[c]ases where
arbitration is precluded," and "[d]isputes involving the personal status.', 443 The
437 Id. art. 19(2), translated in JIL Appendix A.
438 Id., translated in JIL Appendix A.
439 Model Law, art. 35(2), supra note 112.
440 Draft Legislation, supra note 374, art. 50, translated in JIL Appendix A.
441 Model Law, art. 34(2), supra note 112.
442 Draft Legislation, supra note 374, art 49, translated in JIL Appendix A.
443 Id. art. 4, translated in JIL Appendix A.
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April Draft Legislation contained an additional clause prohibiting the
arbitration of administrative disputes "concem[ing] the government or public
institutions." 444 We suggest that the PA Act also include language stating
awards will be enforced unless they contravene international public order. 4
Furthermore, the PA should explicitly define and state the subject matter not
capable of settlement by arbitration as well as any relevant public policy within
the Act. This will keep the Model Law's spirit of transparency alive and clarify
the role of arbitration proceedings.
XIV. DRAFT PALESTNIAN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
LAW
In June 1999 we chaired a roundtable on ADR and international
arbitration hosted by the PA Minister of Trade of Economy in Ramallah.
Representatives from the PA's legal community, legal scholars and
practitioners participated in the meeting. The participants discussed the unique
elements of international commercial arbitration in Palestine. Based on those
discussions, we proposed a draft Palestinian International Commercial
Arbitration Law [See Appendix B.] The law is based on the Model Law with
modifications specific to Palestine.
While the PA can and should enact an international commercial arbitration
law that incorporates international standards, it cannot, at this time, be party to
most multilateral treaties. In our view, the PA can make arbitration treaties
consonant with its responsibilities under Oslo (they certainly can do so with
Israeli acquiescence) but it is not certain that the consensus of states or
international organizations will accept their validity. While we fully recognize
the national sensitivities involved, we suggest that for an interim period
(perhaps 5 years) the PA and parties contracting in the PA arbitrate their
disputes outside of the WBG in a state that is party to one of the international
conventions on the recognition of foreign awards. This will ensure that the
arbitration award is recognized in states outside WBG. The PA's own
international arbitration act will be sufficient to ensure that the agreement to
arbitrate as well as the award is recognized in Palestine.
We also suggest that the Board for Investment Incentive write a model
arbitration clause for inclusion in commercial agreements to which the PA or
Palestinian businesses are party. This clause should state the place of
arbitration, the rules, the law and the language to be used in the settlement of
the dispute. Because the WBG legal system is not yet fully developed, we
suggest naming a legal system that is more established. One possibility is
naming Egyptian law as the law of arbitration and Egypt as the place of the
"4A Draft Legislation, supra note 374, art. 4, translated in JIL Appendix A.
445 Draft Legislation art. 48, translated in JIL Appendix A. See Kenneth-Michael Curtin,
Redefining Public Policy Arbitration of Mandatory National Laws, 271 DEFENSE COUNSELJ.
271 (1997) (advocating the formation of "international" and "transnational" public policy
exceptions to replace "national" public policy exceptions).
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arbitration. This offers the advantage of a law that is more transparent than the
current WBG legal regime.446 It also affords the possibility of using an
institutional arbitration manager such as the Cairo Regional Centre for
International Commercial Arbitration and its rules. The Arab Association for
International Arbitration in Amman is another option, 447 as are the recent
Arbitration Centers created in Lebanon,448 Tunis,449 Yemen,450 and the GCC.45'
Reference to rules and laws outside of Palestine, may, at least in the interim
period, provide a practical solution for the enforcement of commercial
arbitration awards-a matter of importance to all parties.
One other possibility is to "formalize" the present private arbitration
scheme of the Palestinian Chamber of Commerce in Gaza and require the
Chamber to follow the PA arbitration statute in its dispute resolution
activities.452 Whether or not the Gaza Chamber is the forum of choice for
resolution of most commercial disputes between Gazan businessmen, (as it
appears to be),453 its influence is certainly significant. Through agreements with
other Arab Chambers it offers arbitration between Gazans and many foreign
countries.454 It has no dispute resolution mechanism, however, with Israel.
446 Another option is the UNCITRAL Rules. Parties do not need to be a member of
UNCITRAL to apply the rules.
447 The AAAI was created in 1991 and has worked closely with certain arbitration
institutions. See Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, Why Create theArabAssociationforlnternational
Arbitration?, 9 J. INT'LARB. 29 (1992). The AAAI asserts that "disputes submitted to the...
[International Chamber of Commerce, the American Arbitration Association and the London
Court of International Arbitration] are in safe hands, even more so as there is an Arab
participation in the arbitral tribunals composed by these centers to settle disputes." Id.at 32.
These institutions provide "mixed tribunals which respect Arab laws, where applicable." Id.
We must note that there have been no cases taken, as yet, under the Amman Convention. See
Jaili, supra note 226.
448 See Lebanese Arbitration Associated Created, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB., (Nov. 1995), at
17 (explaining that the aim of the association is to create arbitration centers).
449 See Tunisia - Economic Policy and Trade Practices, MARKET REP., Feb. 1991,
available in LEXIS, Country Reports, Tunisia Country Information File.
450 See Announcement of establishment of the Yemeni Centre for Conciliation and
Arbitration in Eugene Cotran, and Chibli Mallat, 3 YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 555-58 (1996).
451 See generally Richard H. Kreindler, An Overview of the Arbitration Rules of the
Recently Established GCC Commercial Arbitration Centre, Bahrain, 12 ARAB L.Q. 3 (1997)
(discussing the background, development and possible future of the GCC Centre among Arab
states).
452 See ENFORCEMENT, supra note 50, at 35-58.
453 Id. at 35, fn. 60.
4-4 Id. at 36, fn. 64. We have no information as yet about the West Bank Chamber in this
regard.
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XV. CONCLUSION
"International arbitration is closely linked to international commerce, to
international investments, and therefore to money and business.' '455 Palestine's
economic development is important to the success of the peace process, and
foreign investment in Palestine is a primary requirement for the economic
development. The PA must address foreign investment issues so that its laws
are not only up to international and regional standards, but transparent to would
be investors.
Although the PA cannot currently ratify the international conventions
regarding arbitration, it can enact laws that clearly reflect these standards and
offer investors those incentives and protections they require; in particular,
providing for the recognition and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate and
recognition of foreign awards. The UNCITRAL Model law is internationally
recognized and is becoming more standard in the Middle East, and certainly
within the EU. Most new international commercial arbitration laws are at least
based on the Model Law. The PA, by basing its law on the Model Law, can
provide investors with the transparency and protections they demand.
Of course merely enacting a new law is not the entire solution. Practical
solutions require long term commitment from political, institutional and
professional sectors in WBG, as well as the commitment of the international
community to invest. Investment in WBG must be free from political influence
and the courts must enforce arbitration agreements as well as foreign awards.
Thus, one recent commentator has suggested, "it is important for the Palestinian
Authority to build a solid track record of working with the legal and regulatory
framework and to avoid measures that would increase the perceived risk of
future government meddling and arbitrary intervention in private activities.
456
An international commercial arbitration act based on the Model Law and
bilateral investment agreements goes far in that regard. To attract investment
from the international community, the PA must amend their laws. To attract
foreign investment now, the PA must act now. A clear international commercial
arbitration law, reflecting international standards, will benefit both the WBG
and foreign investors.
455 E1-Ahdab, supra note 123, at 336.
456 Oussama Kanaan, The Peace Process, Uncertainty and Private Investment in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, Vol. 6, MIDDLE EAST POLICY (No. 2) 67-75 (1998).
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